Improvements and error handling

Timshel 3 months ago
parent 2543956344
commit c61afd966f

@ -161,6 +161,10 @@
## Cron schedule of the job that cleans expired Duo contexts from the database. Does nothing if Duo MFA is disabled or set to use the legacy iframe prompt.
## Defaults to every minute. Set blank to disable this job.
# DUO_CONTEXT_PURGE_SCHEDULE="30 * * * * *"
#
## Cron schedule of the job that cleans sso nonce from incomplete flow
## Defaults to daily (20 minutes after midnight). Set blank to disable this job.
# PURGE_INCOMPLETE_SSO_NONCE="0 20 0 * * *"
########################
### General settings ###
@ -440,11 +444,31 @@
# SSO_ENABLED=false
## Prevent users from logging in directly without going through SSO
# SSO_ONLY=false
## On SSO Signup if a user with a matching email already exists make the association
# SSO_SIGNUPS_MATCH_EMAIL=true
## Base URL of the OIDC server (auto-discovery is used)
## - Should not include the `/.well-known/openid-configuration` part and no trailing `/`
## - ${SSO_AUTHORITY}/.well-known/openid-configuration should return a json document: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderConfigurationResponse
# SSO_AUTHORITY=https://auth.example.com
## Authorization request scopes. Optional SSO scopes, override if email and profile are not enough (`openid` is implicit).
#SSO_SCOPES="email profile"
## Additionnal authorization url parameters (ex: to obtain a `refresh_token` with Google Auth).
# SSO_AUTHORIZE_EXTRA_PARAMS="access_type=offline&prompt=consent"
## Activate PKCE for the Auth Code flow. Recommended but disabled for now waiting for feedback on support.
# SSO_PKCE=false
## Regex to add additionnal trusted audience to Id Token (by default only the client_id is trusted).
# SSO_AUDIENCE_TRUSTED='^$'
## Set your Client ID and Client Key
# SSO_CLIENT_ID=11111
# SSO_CLIENT_SECRET=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
## Optional Master password policy (minComplexity=[0-4])
# SSO_MASTER_PASSWORD_POLICY='{"enforceOnLogin":false,"minComplexity":3,"minLength":12,"requireLower":false,"requireNumbers":false,"requireSpecial":false,"requireUpper":false}'
## Use sso only for authentication not the session lifecycle
# SSO_AUTH_ONLY_NOT_SESSION=false
## Client cache for discovery endpoint. Duration in seconds (0 to disable).
# SSO_CLIENT_CACHE_EXPIRATION=0
## Log all the tokens, LOG_LEVEL=debug is required
# SSO_DEBUG_TOKENS=false
########################
### MFA/2FA settings ###

663
Cargo.lock generated

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ paste = "1.0.15"
governor = "0.7.0"
# OIDC for SSO
openidconnect = "3.4.0"
openidconnect = "3.5.0"
mini-moka = "0.10.2"
# Check client versions for specific features.
semver = "1.0.23"

286
SSO.md

@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
# SSO using OpenId Connect
To use an external source of authentication your SSO will need to support OpenID Connect :
- An OpenID Connect Discovery endpoint should be available
- Client authentication will be done using Id and Secret.
A master password will still be required and not controlled by the SSO (depending on your point of view this might be a feature ;).
This introduces another way to control who can use the vault without having to use invitation or using an LDAP.
## Configuration
The following configurations are available
- `SSO_ENABLED` : Activate the SSO
- `SSO_ONLY` : disable email+Master password authentication
- `SSO_SIGNUPS_MATCH_EMAIL`: On SSO Signup if a user with a matching email already exists make the association (default `true`)
- `SSO_AUTHORITY` : the OpenID Connect Discovery endpoint of your SSO
- Should not include the `/.well-known/openid-configuration` part and no trailing `/`
- $SSO_AUTHORITY/.well-known/openid-configuration should return the a json document: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html#ProviderConfigurationResponse
- `SSO_SCOPES` : Optional, allow to override scopes if needed (default `"email profile"`)
- `SSO_AUTHORIZE_EXTRA_PARAMS` : Optional, allow to add extra parameter to the authorize redirection (default `""`)
- `SSO_PKCE`: Activate PKCE for the Auth Code flow. Recommended but disabled for now waiting for feedback on support (default `false`).
- `SSO_AUDIENCE_TRUSTED`: Optional, Regex to trust additional audience for the IdToken (`client_id` is always trusted). Use single quote when writing the regex: `'^$'`.
- `SSO_CLIENT_ID` : Client Id
- `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET` : Client Secret
- `SSO_MASTER_PASSWORD_POLICY`: Optional Master password policy
- `SSO_AUTH_ONLY_NOT_SESSION`: Enable to use SSO only for authentication not session lifecycle
- `SSO_CLIENT_CACHE_EXPIRATION`: Cache calls to the discovery endpoint, duration in seconds, `0` to disable (default `0`);
- `SSO_DEBUG_TOKENS`: Log all tokens (default `false`, `LOG_LEVEL=debug` is required)
The callback url is : `https://your.domain/identity/connect/oidc-signin`
## Account and Email handling
When logging in with SSO an identifier (`{iss}/{sub}` claims from the IdToken) is saved in a separate table (`sso_users`).
This is used to link to the SSO provider identifier without changing the default Vaultwarden user `uuid`. This is needed because:
- Storing the SSO identifier is important to prevent account takeover due to email change.
- We can't use the identifier as the User uuid since it's way longer (Max 255 chars for the `sub` part, cf [spec](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDToken)).
- We want to be able to associate existing account based on `email` but only when the user logs in for the first time (controlled by `SSO_SIGNUPS_MATCH_EMAIL`).
- We need to be able to associate with existing stub account, such as the one created when inviting a user to an org (association is possible only if the user does not have a private key).
Additionally:
- Signup to Vaultwarden will be blocked if the Provider reports the email as `unverified`.
- Changing the email needs to be done by the user since it requires updating the `key`.
On login if the email returned by the provider is not the one saved in Vaultwarden an email will be sent to the user to ask him to update it.
- If set `SIGNUPS_DOMAINS_WHITELIST` is applied on SSO signup and when attempting to change the email.
This means that if you ever need to change the provider url or the provider itself; you'll have to first delete the association
then ensure that `SSO_SIGNUPS_MATCH_EMAIL` is activated to allow a new association.
To delete the association (this has no impact on the `Vaultwarden` user):
```sql
TRUNCATE TABLE sso_users;
```
## Client Cache
By default the client cache is disabled since it can cause issues with the signing keys.
\
This means that the discovery endpoint will be called again each time we need to interact with the provider (generating authorize_url, exchange the authorize code, refresh tokens).
This is suboptimal so the `SSO_CLIENT_CACHE_EXPIRATION` allows you to configure an expiration that should work for your provider.
As a protection against a misconfigured expiration if the validation of the `IdToken` fails then the client cache is invalidated (but you'll periodically have an unlucky user ^^).
### Google example (Rolling keys)
If we take Google as an example checking the discovery [endpoint](https://accounts.google.com/.well-known/openid-configuration) response headers we can see that the `max-age` of the cache control is set to `3600` seconds. And the [jwk_uri](https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/certs) response headers usually contain a `max-age` with an even bigger value.
/
Combined with user [feedback](https://github.com/ramosbugs/openidconnect-rs/issues/152) we can conclude that Google will roll the signing keys each week.
Setting the cache expiration too high has diminishing return but using something like `600` (10 min) should provide plenty benefits.
### Rolling keys manually
If you want to roll the used key, first add a new one but do not immediately start signing with it.
Wait for the delay you configured in `SSO_CLIENT_CACHE_EXPIRATION` then you can start signing with it.
As mentioned in the Google example setting too high of a value has diminishing return even if you do not plan to roll the keys.
## Keycloak
Default access token lifetime might be only `5min`, set a longer value otherwise it will collide with `VaultWarden` front-end expiration detection which is also set at `5min`.
\
At the realm level
- `Realm settings / Tokens / Access Token Lifespan` to at least `10min` (`accessTokenLifespan` setting when using `kcadm.sh`).
- `Realm settings / Sessions / SSO Session Idle/Max` for the Refresh token lifetime
Or for a specific client in `Clients / Client details / Advanced / Advanced settings` you can find `Access Token Lifespan` and `Client Session Idle/Max`.
Server configuration, nothing specific just set:
- `SSO_AUTHORITY=https://${domain}/realms/${realm_name}`
- `SSO_CLIENT_ID`
- `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET`
- `SSO_PKCE=true`
## Auth0
Not working due to the following issue https://github.com/ramosbugs/openidconnect-rs/issues/23 (they appear not to follow the spec).
A feature flag is available to bypass the issue but since it's a compile time feature you will have to patch `Vaultwarden` with something like:
```patch
diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml
index 0524a7be..9999e852 100644
--- a/Cargo.toml
+++ b/Cargo.toml
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ paste = "1.0.15"
governor = "0.6.3"
# OIDC for SSO
-openidconnect = "3.5.0"
+openidconnect = { version = "3.5.0", features = ["accept-rfc3339-timestamps"] }
mini-moka = "0.10.2"
```
There is no plan at the moment to either always activate the feature nor make a specific distribution for Auth0.
## Authelia
To obtain a `refresh_token` to be able to extend session you'll need to add the `offline_access` scope.
Config will look like:
- `SSO_SCOPES="email profile offline_access"`
## Authentik
Default access token lifetime might be only `5min`, set a longer value otherwise it will collide with `VaultWarden` front-end expiration detection which is also set at `5min`.
\
To change the tokens expiration go to `Applications / Providers / Edit / Advanced protocol settings`.
Starting with `2024.2` version you will need to add the `offline_access` scope and ensure it's selected in `Applications / Providers / Edit / Advanced protocol settings / Scopes` ([Doc](https://docs.goauthentik.io/docs/providers/oauth2/#authorization_code)).
Server configuration should look like:
- `SSO_AUTHORITY=https://${domain}/application/o/${application_name}/` : trailing `/` is important
- `SSO_SCOPES="email profile offline_access"`
- `SSO_CLIENT_ID`
- `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET`
- `SSO_PKCE=true`
## Casdoor
Since version [v1.639.0](https://github.com/casdoor/casdoor/releases/tag/v1.639.0) should work (Tested with version [v1.686.0](https://github.com/casdoor/casdoor/releases/tag/v1.686.0)).
When creating the application you will need to select the `Token format -> JWT-Standard`.
Then configure your server with:
- `SSO_AUTHORITY=https://${provider_host}`
- `SSO_CLIENT_ID`
- `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET`
- `SSO_PKCE=true`
## GitLab
Create an application in your Gitlab Settings with
- `redirectURI`: https://your.domain/identity/connect/oidc-signin
- `Confidential`: `true`
- `scopes`: `openid`, `profile`, `email`
Then configure your server with
- `SSO_AUTHORITY=https://gitlab.com`
- `SSO_CLIENT_ID`
- `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET`
- `SSO_PKCE=true`
## Google Auth
Google [Documentation](https://developers.google.com/identity/openid-connect/openid-connect).
\
By default without extra [configuration](https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/web-server#creatingclient) you won´t have a `refresh_token` and session will be limited to 1h.
Configure your server with :
- `SSO_AUTHORITY=https://accounts.google.com`
- `SSO_AUTHORIZE_EXTRA_PARAMS="access_type=offline&prompt=consent"`
- `SSO_PKCE=true`
- `SSO_CLIENT_ID`
- `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET`
## Kanidm
Kanidm recommend always running with PKCE:
Config will look like:
- `SSO_PKCE=true`
Otherwise you can disable the PKCE requirement with: `kanidm system oauth2 warning-insecure-client-disable-pkce CLIENT_NAME --name admin`.
## Microsoft Entra ID
1. Create an "App registration" in [Entra ID](https://entra.microsoft.com/) following [Identity | Applications | App registrations](https://entra.microsoft.com/#blade/Microsoft_AAD_RegisteredApps/ApplicationsListBlade/quickStartType//sourceType/Microsoft_AAD_IAM).
2. From the "Overview" of your "App registration", you'll need the "Directory (tenant) ID" for the `SSO_AUTHORITY` variable and the "Application (client) ID" as the `SSO_CLIENT_ID` value.
3. In "Certificates & Secrets" create an "App secret" , you'll need the "Secret Value" for the `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET` variable.
4. In "Authentication" add <https://vaultwarden.example.org/identity/connect/oidc-signin> as "Web Redirect URI".
5. In "API Permissions" make sure you have `profile`, `email` and `offline_access` listed under "API / Permission name" (`offline_access` is required, otherwise no refresh_token is returned, see <https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/azure-docs/issues/17134>).
Only the v2 endpoint is compliant with the OpenID spec, see <https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/azure-docs/issues/38427> and <https://github.com/ramosbugs/openidconnect-rs/issues/122>.
Your configuration should look like this:
* `SSO_AUTHORITY=https://login.microsoftonline.com/${Directory (tenant) ID}/v2.0`
* `SSO_SCOPES="email profile offline_access"`
* `SSO_CLIENT_ID=${Application (client) ID}`
* `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET=${Secret Value}`
## Zitadel
To obtain a `refresh_token` to be able to extend session you'll need to add the `offline_access` scope.
Additionally Zitadel include the `Project id` and the `Client Id` in the audience of the Id Token.
For the validation to work you will need to add the `Resource Id` as a trusted audience (`Client Id` is trusted by default).
You can control the trusted audience with the config `SSO_AUDIENCE_TRUSTED`
It appears it's not possible to use PKCE with confidential client so it needs to be disabled.
Config will look like:
- `SSO_AUTHORITY=https://${provider_host}`
- `SSO_SCOPES="email profile offline_access"`
- `SSO_CLIENT_ID`
- `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET`
- `SSO_AUDIENCE_TRUSTED='^${Project Id}$'`
- `SSO_PKCE=false`
## Session lifetime
Session lifetime is dependant on refresh token and access token returned after calling your SSO token endpoint (grant type `authorization_code`).
If no refresh token is returned then the session will be limited to the access token lifetime.
Tokens are not persisted in VaultWarden but wrapped in JWT tokens and returned to the application (The `refresh_token` and `access_token` values returned by VW `identity/connect/token` endpoint).
Note that VaultWarden will always return a `refresh_token` for compatibility reasons with the web front and it presence does not indicate that a refresh token was returned by your SSO (But you can decode its value with <https://jwt.io> and then check if the `token` field contain anything).
With a refresh token present, activity in the application will trigger a refresh of the access token when it's close to expiration ([5min](https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/0bcb45ed5caa990abaff735553a5046e85250f24/libs/common/src/auth/services/token.service.ts#L126) in web client).
Additionally for certain action a token check is performed, if we have a refresh token we will perform a refresh otherwise we'll call the user information endpoint to check the access token validity.
### Disabling SSO session handling
If you are unable to obtain a `refresh_token` or for any other reason you can disable SSO session handling and revert to the default handling.
You'll need to enable `SSO_AUTH_ONLY_NOT_SESSION=true` then access token will be valid for 2h and refresh token will allow for an idle time of 7 days (which can be indefinitely extended).
### Debug information
Running with `LOG_LEVEL=debug` you'll be able to see information on token expiration.
## Desktop Client
There is some issue to handle redirection from your browser (used for sso login) to the application.
### Chrome
Probably not much hope, an [issue](https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/issues/2606) is open on the subject and it appears that both Linux and Windows are not working.
## Firefox
On Windows you'll be presented with a prompt the first time you log to confirm which application should be launched (But there is a bug at the moment you might end-up with an empty vault after login atm).
On Linux it's a bit more tricky.
First you'll need to add some config in `about:config` :
```conf
network.protocol-handler.expose.bitwarden=false
network.protocol-handler.external.bitwarden=true
```
If you have any doubt you can check `mailto` to see how it's configured.
The redirection will still not work since it appears that the association to an application can only be done on a link/click. You can trigger it with a dummy page such as:
```html
data:text/html,<a href="bitwarden:///dummy">Click me to register Bitwarden</a>
```
From now on the redirection should now work.
If you need to change the application launched you can now find it in `Settings` by using the search function and entering `application`.

@ -26,4 +26,11 @@ elif [ -d /etc/bitwarden_rs.d ]; then
done
fi
# Toggle the SSO Link
if [ "$SSO_ENABLED" = "true" ]; then
sed -i 's#a\[routerlink="/sso"\]#a\[routerlink="/sso-sed"\]#' /web-vault/app/main.*.css
else
sed -i 's#a\[routerlink="/sso-sed"\]#a\[routerlink="/sso"\]#' /web-vault/app/main.*.css
fi
exec /vaultwarden "${@}"

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
nonce CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY
);

@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
nonce CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);

@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN invited_by_email;

@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN invited_by_email TEXT DEFAULT NULL;

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
nonce CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
state VARCHAR(512) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
state VARCHAR(512) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
state VARCHAR(512) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
verifier TEXT,
redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
CREATE TABLE sso_users (
user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
identifier VARCHAR(768) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
FOREIGN KEY(user_uuid) REFERENCES users(uuid)
);

@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
ALTER TABLE sso_users DROP FOREIGN KEY `sso_users_ibfk_1`;
ALTER TABLE sso_users ADD FOREIGN KEY(user_uuid) REFERENCES users(uuid) ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE;

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
nonce CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY
);

@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
nonce CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);

@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN invited_by_email;

@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN invited_by_email TEXT DEFAULT NULL;

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
DROP TABLE sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
nonce CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
DROP TABLE sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
state TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
state TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
state TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
verifier TEXT,
redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
CREATE TABLE sso_users (
user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
identifier TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
FOREIGN KEY(user_uuid) REFERENCES users(uuid)
);

@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
ALTER TABLE sso_users
DROP CONSTRAINT "sso_users_user_uuid_fkey",
ADD CONSTRAINT "sso_users_user_uuid_fkey" FOREIGN KEY(user_uuid) REFERENCES users(uuid) ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE;

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
nonce CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY
);

@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
nonce CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);

@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN invited_by_email;

@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN invited_by_email TEXT DEFAULT NULL;

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
DROP TABLE sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
nonce CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
DROP TABLE sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
state TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
state TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sso_nonce;
CREATE TABLE sso_nonce (
state TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
verifier TEXT,
redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
CREATE TABLE sso_users (
user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
identifier TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
FOREIGN KEY(user_uuid) REFERENCES users(uuid)
);

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sso_users;
CREATE TABLE sso_users (
user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
identifier TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
FOREIGN KEY(user_uuid) REFERENCES users(uuid) ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE
);

@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ async fn invite_user(data: Json<InviteData>, _token: AdminToken, mut conn: DbCon
err_code!("User already exists", Status::Conflict.code)
}
let mut user = User::new(data.email);
let mut user = User::new(data.email, None);
async fn _generate_invite(user: &User, conn: &mut DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
use crate::{
api::{
core::{log_user_event, two_factor::email},
register_push_device, unregister_push_device, AnonymousNotify, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify,
register_push_device, unregister_push_device, AnonymousNotify, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify,
PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
},
auth::{decode_delete, decode_invite, decode_verify_email, ClientHeaders, Headers},
@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ pub struct SetPasswordData {
keys: Option<KeysData>,
master_password_hash: String,
master_password_hint: Option<String>,
#[allow(dead_code)]
org_identifier: Option<String>,
// org_identifier: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@ -103,13 +102,6 @@ struct KeysData {
public_key: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct TokenPayload {
exp: i64,
email: String,
nonce: String,
}
/// Trims whitespace from password hints, and converts blank password hints to `None`.
fn clean_password_hint(password_hint: &Option<String>) -> Option<String> {
match password_hint {
@ -182,10 +174,7 @@ pub async fn _register(data: Json<RegisterData>, mut conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult
err!("Registration email does not match invite email")
}
} else if Invitation::take(&email, &mut conn).await {
for user_org in UserOrganization::find_invited_by_user(&user.uuid, &mut conn).await.iter_mut() {
user_org.status = UserOrgStatus::Accepted as i32;
user_org.save(&mut conn).await?;
}
UserOrganization::confirm_user_invitations(&user.uuid, &mut conn).await?;
user
} else if CONFIG.is_signup_allowed(&email)
|| (CONFIG.emergency_access_allowed()
@ -201,7 +190,7 @@ pub async fn _register(data: Json<RegisterData>, mut conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult
// because the vaultwarden admin can invite anyone, regardless
// of other signup restrictions.
if Invitation::take(&email, &mut conn).await || CONFIG.is_signup_allowed(&email) {
User::new(email.clone())
User::new(email.clone(), None)
} else {
err!("Registration not allowed or user already exists")
}
@ -272,7 +261,7 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, mut co
// Check against the password hint setting here so if it fails, the user
// can retry without losing their invitation below.
let password_hint = clean_password_hint(&data.master_password_hash);
let password_hint = clean_password_hint(&data.master_password_hint);
enforce_password_hint_setting(&password_hint)?;
if let Some(client_kdf_iter) = data.kdf_iterations {
@ -983,15 +972,30 @@ struct SecretVerificationRequest {
master_password_hash: String,
}
// Change the KDF Iterations if necessary
pub async fn kdf_upgrade(user: &mut User, pwd_hash: &str, conn: &mut DbConn) -> ApiResult<()> {
if user.password_iterations != CONFIG.password_iterations() {
user.password_iterations = CONFIG.password_iterations();
user.set_password(pwd_hash, None, false, None);
if let Err(e) = user.save(conn).await {
error!("Error updating user: {:#?}", e);
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[post("/accounts/verify-password", data = "<data>")]
fn verify_password(data: Json<SecretVerificationRequest>, headers: Headers) -> JsonResult {
async fn verify_password(data: Json<SecretVerificationRequest>, headers: Headers, mut conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: SecretVerificationRequest = data.into_inner();
let user = headers.user;
let mut user = headers.user;
if !user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
err!("Invalid password")
}
kdf_upgrade(&mut user, &data.master_password_hash, &mut conn).await?;
Ok(Json(json!({
"MasterPasswordPolicy": {}, // Required for SSO login with mobile apps
})))

@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, mu
invitation.save(&mut conn).await?;
}
let mut user = User::new(email.clone());
let mut user = User::new(email.clone(), None);
user.save(&mut conn).await?;
(user, true)
}

@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
list_policies,
list_policies_token,
list_policies_invited_user,
get_policy_master_password,
get_policy,
put_policy,
get_organization_tax,
@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ async fn create_organization(headers: Headers, data: Json<OrgData>, mut conn: Db
};
let org = Organization::new(data.name, data.billing_email, private_key, public_key);
let mut user_org = UserOrganization::new(headers.user.uuid, org.uuid.clone());
let mut user_org = UserOrganization::new(headers.user.uuid, org.uuid.clone(), None);
let collection = Collection::new(org.uuid.clone(), data.collection_name, None);
user_org.akey = data.key;
@ -308,9 +309,13 @@ async fn get_user_collections(headers: Headers, mut conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value>
}))
}
// Called during the SSO enrollment
// The `_identifier` should be the harcoded value returned by `get_org_domain_sso_details`
// The returned `Id` will then be passed to `get_policy_master_password` which will mainly ignore it
#[get("/organizations/<_identifier>/auto-enroll-status")]
fn get_auto_enroll_status(_identifier: String) -> JsonResult {
fn get_auto_enroll_status(_identifier: &str) -> JsonResult {
Ok(Json(json!({
"Id": "_",
"ResetPasswordEnabled": false, // Not implemented
})))
}
@ -790,6 +795,9 @@ async fn _get_org_details(org_id: &str, host: &str, user_uuid: &str, conn: &mut
json!(ciphers_json)
}
// Endpoint called when the user select SSO login (body: `{ "email": "" }`).
// Returning a Domain/Organization here allow to prefill it and prevent prompting the user
// VaultWarden sso login is not linked to Org so we set a dummy value.
#[post("/organizations/domain/sso/details")]
fn get_org_domain_sso_details() -> JsonResult {
Ok(Json(json!({
@ -907,7 +915,7 @@ async fn send_invite(org_id: &str, data: Json<InviteData>, headers: AdminHeaders
invitation.save(&mut conn).await?;
}
let mut user = User::new(email.clone());
let mut user = User::new(email.clone(), None);
user.save(&mut conn).await?;
user
}
@ -924,7 +932,8 @@ async fn send_invite(org_id: &str, data: Json<InviteData>, headers: AdminHeaders
}
};
let mut new_user = UserOrganization::new(user.uuid.clone(), String::from(org_id));
let mut new_user =
UserOrganization::new(user.uuid.clone(), String::from(org_id), Some(headers.user.email.clone()));
let access_all = data.access_all;
new_user.access_all = access_all;
new_user.atype = new_type;
@ -1760,17 +1769,22 @@ async fn list_policies_token(org_id: &str, token: &str, mut conn: DbConn) -> Jso
})))
}
// Called during the SSO enrollment.
// Since the VW SSO flow is not linked to an organization it will be called with a dummy or undefined `org_id`
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
#[get("/organizations/<org_id>/policies/invited-user?<userId>")]
async fn list_policies_invited_user(org_id: String, userId: String, mut conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
// We should confirm the user is part of the organization, but unique domain_hints must be supported first.
async fn list_policies_invited_user(org_id: &str, userId: &str, mut conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
if userId.is_empty() {
err!("userId must not be empty");
}
let policies = OrgPolicy::find_by_org(&org_id, &mut conn).await;
let policies_json: Vec<Value> = policies.iter().map(OrgPolicy::to_json).collect();
let user_orgs = UserOrganization::find_invited_by_user(userId, &mut conn).await;
let policies_json: Vec<Value> = if user_orgs.into_iter().any(|user_org| user_org.org_uuid == org_id) {
let policies = OrgPolicy::find_by_org(org_id, &mut conn).await;
policies.iter().map(OrgPolicy::to_json).collect()
} else {
Vec::with_capacity(0)
};
Ok(Json(json!({
"Data": policies_json,
@ -1779,7 +1793,26 @@ async fn list_policies_invited_user(org_id: String, userId: String, mut conn: Db
})))
}
#[get("/organizations/<org_id>/policies/<pol_type>")]
// Called during the SSO enrollment.
#[get("/organizations/<org_id>/policies/master-password", rank = 1)]
fn get_policy_master_password(org_id: &str, _headers: Headers) -> JsonResult {
let data = match CONFIG.sso_master_password_policy() {
Some(policy) => policy,
None => "null".to_string(),
};
let policy = OrgPolicy {
uuid: String::from(org_id),
org_uuid: String::from(org_id),
atype: OrgPolicyType::MasterPassword as i32,
enabled: CONFIG.sso_master_password_policy().is_some(),
data,
};
Ok(Json(policy.to_json()))
}
#[get("/organizations/<org_id>/policies/<pol_type>", rank = 2)]
async fn get_policy(org_id: &str, pol_type: i32, _headers: AdminHeaders, mut conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let pol_type_enum = match OrgPolicyType::from_i32(pol_type) {
Some(pt) => pt,
@ -2047,7 +2080,8 @@ async fn import(org_id: &str, data: Json<OrgImportData>, headers: Headers, mut c
UserOrgStatus::Accepted as i32 // Automatically mark user as accepted if no email invites
};
let mut new_org_user = UserOrganization::new(user.uuid.clone(), String::from(org_id));
let mut new_org_user =
UserOrganization::new(user.uuid.clone(), String::from(org_id), Some(headers.user.email.clone()));
new_org_user.access_all = false;
new_org_user.atype = UserOrgType::User as i32;
new_org_user.status = user_org_status;

@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, mut conn: Db
Some(user) => user, // exists in vaultwarden
None => {
// User does not exist yet
let mut new_user = User::new(user_data.email.clone());
let mut new_user = User::new(user_data.email.clone(), None);
new_user.save(&mut conn).await?;
if !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
@ -109,7 +109,12 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, mut conn: Db
UserOrgStatus::Accepted as i32 // Automatically mark user as accepted if no email invites
};
let mut new_org_user = UserOrganization::new(user.uuid.clone(), org_id.clone());
let (org_name, org_email) = match Organization::find_by_uuid(&org_id, &mut conn).await {
Some(org) => (org.name, org.billing_email),
None => err!("Error looking up organization"),
};
let mut new_org_user = UserOrganization::new(user.uuid.clone(), org_id.clone(), Some(org_email.clone()));
new_org_user.set_external_id(Some(user_data.external_id.clone()));
new_org_user.access_all = false;
new_org_user.atype = UserOrgType::User as i32;
@ -118,11 +123,6 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, mut conn: Db
new_org_user.save(&mut conn).await?;
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
let (org_name, org_email) = match Organization::find_by_uuid(&org_id, &mut conn).await {
Some(org) => (org.name, org.billing_email),
None => err!("Error looking up organization"),
};
mail::send_invite(&user, Some(org_id.clone()), Some(new_org_user.uuid), &org_name, Some(org_email))
.await?;
}

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
use chrono::Utc;
use jsonwebtoken::DecodingKey;
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
use rocket::serde::json::Json;
use rocket::{
form::{Form, FromForm},
http::CookieJar,
http::Status,
response::Redirect,
serde::json::Json,
Route,
};
use serde_json::Value;
@ -12,23 +12,22 @@ use serde_json::Value;
use crate::{
api::{
core::{
accounts::{PreloginData, RegisterData, _prelogin, _register},
accounts::{PreloginData, RegisterData, _prelogin, _register, kdf_upgrade},
log_user_event,
two_factor::{authenticator, duo, duo_oidc, email, enforce_2fa_policy, webauthn, yubikey},
},
push::register_push_device,
ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult,
},
auth::{encode_jwt, generate_organization_api_key_login_claims, generate_ssotoken_claims, ClientHeaders, ClientIp},
auth,
auth::{AuthMethod, AuthMethodScope, ClientHeaders, ClientIp},
db::{models::*, DbConn},
error::MapResult,
mail, util,
util::{CookieManager, CustomRedirect},
CONFIG,
mail, sso, util, CONFIG,
};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![login, prelogin, identity_register, prevalidate, authorize, oidcsignin]
routes![login, prelogin, identity_register, _prevalidate, prevalidate, authorize, oidcsignin, oidcsignin_error]
}
#[post("/connect/token", data = "<data>")]
@ -42,6 +41,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, mut conn:
_check_is_some(&data.refresh_token, "refresh_token cannot be blank")?;
_refresh_login(data, &mut conn).await
}
"password" if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() => err!("SSO sign-in is required"),
"password" => {
_check_is_some(&data.client_id, "client_id cannot be blank")?;
_check_is_some(&data.password, "password cannot be blank")?;
@ -65,15 +65,17 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, mut conn:
_api_key_login(data, &mut user_uuid, &mut conn, &client_header.ip).await
}
"authorization_code" => {
"authorization_code" if CONFIG.sso_enabled() => {
_check_is_some(&data.client_id, "client_id cannot be blank")?;
_check_is_some(&data.code, "code cannot be blank")?;
_check_is_some(&data.device_identifier, "device_identifier cannot be blank")?;
_check_is_some(&data.device_name, "device_name cannot be blank")?;
_check_is_some(&data.device_type, "device_type cannot be blank")?;
_authorization_login(data, &mut user_uuid, &mut conn, &client_header.ip).await
_sso_login(data, &mut user_uuid, &mut conn, &client_header.ip).await
}
"authorization_code" => err!("SSO sign-in is not available"),
t => err!("Invalid type", t),
};
@ -107,172 +109,147 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, mut conn:
login_result
}
// Return Status::Unauthorized to trigger logout
async fn _refresh_login(data: ConnectData, conn: &mut DbConn) -> JsonResult {
// Extract token
let token = data.refresh_token.unwrap();
// Get device by refresh token
let mut device = Device::find_by_refresh_token(&token, conn).await.map_res("Invalid refresh token")?;
let scope = "api offline_access";
let scope_vec = vec!["api".into(), "offline_access".into()];
let refresh_token = match data.refresh_token {
Some(token) => token,
None => err_code!("Missing refresh_token", Status::Unauthorized.code),
};
// Common
let user = User::find_by_uuid(&device.user_uuid, conn).await.unwrap();
// ---
// Disabled this variable, it was used to generate the JWT
// Because this might get used in the future, and is add by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
// See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/4156
// ---
// let orgs = UserOrganization::find_confirmed_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await;
let (access_token, expires_in) = device.refresh_tokens(&user, scope_vec);
device.save(conn).await?;
let result = json!({
"access_token": access_token,
"expires_in": expires_in,
"token_type": "Bearer",
"refresh_token": device.refresh_token,
"scope": scope,
});
Ok(Json(result))
match auth::refresh_tokens(&refresh_token, conn).await {
Err(err) => {
err_code!(format!("Unable to refresh login credentials: {}", err.message()), Status::Unauthorized.code)
}
Ok((mut device, auth_tokens)) => {
// Save to update `device.updated_at` to track usage
device.save(conn).await?;
let result = json!({
"refresh_token": auth_tokens.refresh_token(),
"access_token": auth_tokens.access_token(),
"expires_in": auth_tokens.expires_in(),
"token_type": "Bearer",
"scope": auth_tokens.scope(),
});
Ok(Json(result))
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct TokenPayload {
exp: i64,
email: Option<String>,
nonce: String,
}
// After exchanging the code we need to check first if 2FA is needed before continuing
async fn _sso_login(data: ConnectData, user_uuid: &mut Option<String>, conn: &mut DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
AuthMethod::Sso.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;
async fn _authorization_login(
data: ConnectData,
user_uuid: &mut Option<String>,
conn: &mut DbConn,
ip: &ClientIp,
) -> JsonResult {
let scope = match data.scope.as_ref() {
None => err!("Got no scope in OIDC data"),
Some(scope) => scope,
};
if scope != "api offline_access" {
err!("Scope not supported")
}
// Ratelimit the login
crate::ratelimit::check_limit_login(&ip.ip)?;
let scope_vec = vec!["api".into(), "offline_access".into()];
let code = match data.code.as_ref() {
None => err!("Got no code in OIDC data"),
Some(code) => code,
};
let (refresh_token, id_token, user_info) = match get_auth_code_access_token(code).await {
Ok((refresh_token, id_token, user_info)) => (refresh_token, id_token, user_info),
Err(_err) => err!("Could not retrieve access token"),
};
let mut validation = jsonwebtoken::Validation::default();
validation.insecure_disable_signature_validation();
let token =
match jsonwebtoken::decode::<TokenPayload>(id_token.as_str(), &DecodingKey::from_secret(&[]), &validation) {
Err(_err) => err!("Could not decode id token"),
Ok(payload) => payload.claims,
};
let user_infos = sso::exchange_code(code, conn).await?;
// Will trigger 2FA flow if needed
let user_data = match SsoUser::find_by_identifier_or_email(&user_infos.identifier, &user_infos.email, conn).await {
None => None,
Some((user, None)) if user.private_key.is_some() && !CONFIG.sso_signups_match_email() => {
error!(
"Login failure ({}), existing non SSO user ({}) with same email ({}) and association is disabled",
user_infos.identifier, user.uuid, user.email
);
err_silent!("Existing non SSO user with same email")
}
Some((user, Some(sso_user))) if sso_user.identifier != user_infos.identifier => {
error!(
"Login failure ({}), existing SSO user ({}) with same email ({})",
user_infos.identifier, user.uuid, user.email
);
err_silent!("Existing SSO user with same email")
}
Some((user, sso_user)) => {
let (mut device, new_device) = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;
let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&user, &data, &mut device, ip, conn).await?;
// let expiry = token.exp;
let nonce = token.nonce;
let mut new_user = false;
match SsoNonce::find(&nonce, conn).await {
Some(sso_nonce) => {
match sso_nonce.delete(conn).await {
Ok(_) => {
let user_email = match token.email {
Some(email) => email,
None => match user_info.email() {
None => err!("Neither id token nor userinfo contained an email"),
Some(email) => email.to_owned().to_string(),
},
};
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
let mut user = match User::find_by_mail(&user_email, conn).await {
Some(user) => user,
None => {
new_user = true;
User::new(user_email.clone())
}
};
if new_user {
user.verified_at = Some(Utc::now().naive_utc());
user.save(conn).await?;
}
Some((user, device, new_device, twofactor_token, sso_user))
}
};
// Set the user_uuid here to be passed back used for event logging.
*user_uuid = Some(user.uuid.clone());
// We passed 2FA get full user informations
let auth_user = sso::redeem(&user_infos.state, conn).await?;
let (mut device, new_device) = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await;
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
let (user, mut device, new_device, twofactor_token, sso_user) = match user_data {
None => {
if !CONFIG.is_email_domain_allowed(&user_infos.email) {
err!("Email domain not allowed");
}
let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&user, &data, &mut device, ip, true, conn).await?;
if !user_infos.email_verified.unwrap_or(true) {
err!("Email needs to be verified before you can use VaultWarden");
}
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() && new_device {
if let Err(e) =
mail::send_new_device_logged_in(&user.email, &ip.ip.to_string(), &now, &device.name).await
{
error!("Error sending new device email: {:#?}", e);
let mut user = User::new(user_infos.email, user_infos.user_name);
user.verified_at = Some(now);
user.save(conn).await?;
if CONFIG.require_device_email() {
err!("Could not send login notification email. Please contact your administrator.")
}
}
}
let (device, new_device) = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;
if CONFIG.sso_acceptall_invites() {
for user_org in UserOrganization::find_invited_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await.iter_mut() {
user_org.status = UserOrgStatus::Accepted as i32;
user_org.save(conn).await?;
}
}
(user, device, new_device, None, None)
}
Some((mut user, device, new_device, twofactor_token, sso_user)) if user.private_key.is_none() => {
// User was invited a stub was created
user.verified_at = Some(now);
if let Some(user_name) = user_infos.user_name {
user.name = user_name;
}
device.refresh_token = refresh_token.clone();
device.save(conn).await?;
let (access_token, expires_in) = device.refresh_tokens(&user, scope_vec);
device.save(conn).await?;
let mut result = json!({
"access_token": access_token,
"token_type": "Bearer",
"refresh_token": device.refresh_token,
"expires_in": expires_in,
"Key": user.akey,
"PrivateKey": user.private_key,
"Kdf": user.client_kdf_type,
"KdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
"KdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
"KdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
"ResetMasterPassword": user.password_hash.is_empty(),
"scope": scope,
"unofficialServer": true,
});
if let Some(token) = twofactor_token {
result["TwoFactorToken"] = Value::String(token);
}
if !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
UserOrganization::confirm_user_invitations(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
}
info!("User {} logged in successfully. IP: {}", user.email, ip.ip);
Ok(Json(result))
user.save(conn).await?;
(user, device, new_device, twofactor_token, sso_user)
}
Some((user, device, new_device, twofactor_token, sso_user)) => {
if user.email != user_infos.email {
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
mail::send_sso_change_email(&user_infos.email).await?;
}
Err(_) => err!("Failed to delete nonce"),
info!("User {} email changed in SSO provider from {} to {}", user.uuid, user.email, user_infos.email);
}
(user, device, new_device, twofactor_token, sso_user)
}
None => {
err!("Invalid nonce")
}
};
if sso_user.is_none() {
let user_sso = SsoUser {
user_uuid: user.uuid.clone(),
identifier: user_infos.identifier,
};
user_sso.save(conn).await?;
}
// Set the user_uuid here to be passed back used for event logging.
*user_uuid = Some(user.uuid.clone());
let auth_tokens = sso::create_auth_tokens(
&device,
&user,
auth_user.refresh_token,
&auth_user.access_token,
auth_user.expires_in,
)?;
authenticated_response(&user, &mut device, new_device, auth_tokens, twofactor_token, &now, conn, ip).await
}
#[derive(Default, Deserialize, Serialize)]
@ -294,19 +271,11 @@ async fn _password_login(
ip: &ClientIp,
) -> JsonResult {
// Validate scope
let scope = data.scope.as_ref().unwrap();
if scope != "api offline_access" {
err!("Scope not supported")
}
let scope_vec = vec!["api".into(), "offline_access".into()];
AuthMethod::Password.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;
// Ratelimit the login
crate::ratelimit::check_limit_login(&ip.ip)?;
if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() {
err!("SSO sign-in is required");
}
// Get the user
let username = data.username.as_ref().unwrap().trim();
let mut user = match User::find_by_mail(username, conn).await {
@ -349,15 +318,7 @@ async fn _password_login(
)
}
// Change the KDF Iterations
if user.password_iterations != CONFIG.password_iterations() {
user.password_iterations = CONFIG.password_iterations();
user.set_password(password, None, false, None);
if let Err(e) = user.save(conn).await {
error!("Error updating user: {:#?}", e);
}
}
kdf_upgrade(&mut user, password, conn).await?;
// Check if the user is disabled
if !user.enabled {
@ -404,12 +365,28 @@ async fn _password_login(
)
}
let (mut device, new_device) = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await;
let (mut device, new_device) = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;
let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&user, &data, &mut device, ip, false, conn).await?;
let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&user, &data, &mut device, ip, conn).await?;
let auth_tokens = auth::AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, AuthMethod::Password);
authenticated_response(&user, &mut device, new_device, auth_tokens, twofactor_token, &now, conn, ip).await
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
async fn authenticated_response(
user: &User,
device: &mut Device,
new_device: bool,
auth_tokens: auth::AuthTokens,
twofactor_token: Option<String>,
now: &NaiveDateTime,
conn: &mut DbConn,
ip: &ClientIp,
) -> JsonResult {
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() && new_device {
if let Err(e) = mail::send_new_device_logged_in(&user.email, &ip.ip.to_string(), &now, &device).await {
if let Err(e) = mail::send_new_device_logged_in(&user.email, &ip.ip.to_string(), now, device).await {
error!("Error sending new device email: {:#?}", e);
if CONFIG.require_device_email() {
@ -425,17 +402,10 @@ async fn _password_login(
// register push device
if !new_device {
register_push_device(&mut device, conn).await?;
register_push_device(device, conn).await?;
}
// Common
// ---
// Disabled this variable, it was used to generate the JWT
// Because this might get used in the future, and is add by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
// See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/4156
// ---
// let orgs = UserOrganization::find_confirmed_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await;
let (access_token, expires_in) = device.refresh_tokens(&user, scope_vec);
// Save to update `device.updated_at` to track usage
device.save(conn).await?;
// Fetch all valid Master Password Policies and merge them into one with all true's and larges numbers as one policy
@ -469,14 +439,11 @@ async fn _password_login(
};
let mut result = json!({
"access_token": access_token,
"expires_in": expires_in,
"access_token": auth_tokens.access_token(),
"expires_in": auth_tokens.expires_in(),
"token_type": "Bearer",
"refresh_token": device.refresh_token,
"Key": user.akey,
"refresh_token": auth_tokens.refresh_token(),
"PrivateKey": user.private_key,
//"TwoFactorToken": "11122233333444555666777888999"
"Kdf": user.client_kdf_type,
"KdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
"KdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
@ -484,19 +451,22 @@ async fn _password_login(
"ResetMasterPassword": false, // TODO: Same as above
"ForcePasswordReset": false,
"MasterPasswordPolicy": master_password_policy,
"scope": scope,
"scope": auth_tokens.scope(),
"UserDecryptionOptions": {
"HasMasterPassword": !user.password_hash.is_empty(),
"Object": "userDecryptionOptions"
},
});
if !user.akey.is_empty() {
result["Key"] = Value::String(user.akey.clone());
}
if let Some(token) = twofactor_token {
result["TwoFactorToken"] = Value::String(token);
}
info!("User {} logged in successfully. IP: {}", username, ip.ip);
info!("User {} logged in successfully. IP: {}", user.email, ip.ip);
Ok(Json(result))
}
@ -510,9 +480,9 @@ async fn _api_key_login(
crate::ratelimit::check_limit_login(&ip.ip)?;
// Validate scope
match data.scope.as_ref().unwrap().as_ref() {
"api" => _user_api_key_login(data, user_uuid, conn, ip).await,
"api.organization" => _organization_api_key_login(data, conn, ip).await,
match data.scope.as_ref() {
Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::UserApiKey.scope() => _user_api_key_login(data, user_uuid, conn, ip).await,
Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::OrgApiKey.scope() => _organization_api_key_login(data, conn, ip).await,
_ => err!("Scope not supported"),
}
}
@ -560,7 +530,7 @@ async fn _user_api_key_login(
)
}
let (mut device, new_device) = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await;
let (mut device, new_device) = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() && new_device {
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
@ -578,15 +548,15 @@ async fn _user_api_key_login(
}
}
// Common
let scope_vec = vec!["api".into()];
// ---
// Disabled this variable, it was used to generate the JWT
// Because this might get used in the future, and is add by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
// See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/4156
// ---
// let orgs = UserOrganization::find_confirmed_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await;
let (access_token, expires_in) = device.refresh_tokens(&user, scope_vec);
let access_claims = auth::LoginJwtClaims::default(&device, &user, &AuthMethod::UserApiKey);
// Save to update `device.updated_at` to track usage
device.save(conn).await?;
info!("User {} logged in successfully via API key. IP: {}", user.email, ip.ip);
@ -594,8 +564,8 @@ async fn _user_api_key_login(
// Note: No refresh_token is returned. The CLI just repeats the
// client_credentials login flow when the existing token expires.
let result = json!({
"access_token": access_token,
"expires_in": expires_in,
"access_token": access_claims.token(),
"expires_in": access_claims.expires_in(),
"token_type": "Bearer",
"Key": user.akey,
"PrivateKey": user.private_key,
@ -605,7 +575,7 @@ async fn _user_api_key_login(
"KdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
"KdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
"ResetMasterPassword": false, // TODO: according to official server seems something like: user.password_hash.is_empty(), but would need testing
"scope": "api",
"scope": AuthMethod::UserApiKey.scope(),
});
Ok(Json(result))
@ -629,19 +599,19 @@ async fn _organization_api_key_login(data: ConnectData, conn: &mut DbConn, ip: &
err!("Incorrect client_secret", format!("IP: {}. Organization: {}.", ip.ip, org_api_key.org_uuid))
}
let claim = generate_organization_api_key_login_claims(org_api_key.uuid, org_api_key.org_uuid);
let access_token = crate::auth::encode_jwt(&claim);
let claim = auth::generate_organization_api_key_login_claims(org_api_key.uuid, org_api_key.org_uuid);
let access_token = auth::encode_jwt(&claim);
Ok(Json(json!({
"access_token": access_token,
"expires_in": 3600,
"token_type": "Bearer",
"scope": "api.organization",
"scope": AuthMethod::OrgApiKey.scope(),
})))
}
/// Retrieves an existing device or creates a new device from ConnectData and the User
async fn get_device(data: &ConnectData, conn: &mut DbConn, user: &User) -> (Device, bool) {
async fn get_device(data: &ConnectData, conn: &mut DbConn, user: &User) -> ApiResult<(Device, bool)> {
// On iOS, device_type sends "iOS", on others it sends a number
// When unknown or unable to parse, return 14, which is 'Unknown Browser'
let device_type = util::try_parse_string(data.device_type.as_ref()).unwrap_or(14);
@ -653,12 +623,13 @@ async fn get_device(data: &ConnectData, conn: &mut DbConn, user: &User) -> (Devi
let device = match Device::find_by_uuid_and_user(&device_id, &user.uuid, conn).await {
Some(device) => device,
None => {
let device = Device::new(device_id, user.uuid.clone(), device_name, device_type);
new_device = true;
Device::new(device_id, user.uuid.clone(), device_name, device_type)
device
}
};
(device, new_device)
Ok((device, new_device))
}
async fn twofactor_auth(
@ -666,7 +637,6 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
data: &ConnectData,
device: &mut Device,
ip: &ClientIp,
is_sso: bool,
conn: &mut DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<Option<String>> {
let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await;
@ -684,17 +654,7 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
let twofactor_code = match data.two_factor_token {
Some(ref code) => code,
None => {
if is_sso {
if CONFIG.sso_only() {
err!("2FA not supported with SSO login, contact your administrator");
} else {
err!("2FA not supported with SSO login, log in directly using email and master password");
}
} else {
err_json!(_json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, &user.uuid, data, conn).await?, "2FA token not provided");
}
}
None => err_json!(_json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, &user.uuid, data, conn).await?, "2FA token not provided"),
};
let selected_twofactor = twofactors.into_iter().find(|tf| tf.atype == selected_id && tf.enabled);
@ -756,12 +716,13 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
TwoFactorIncomplete::mark_complete(&user.uuid, &device.uuid, conn).await?;
if !CONFIG.disable_2fa_remember() && remember == 1 {
Ok(Some(device.refresh_twofactor_remember()))
let two_factor = if !CONFIG.disable_2fa_remember() && remember == 1 {
Some(device.refresh_twofactor_remember())
} else {
device.delete_twofactor_remember();
Ok(None)
}
None
};
Ok(two_factor)
}
fn _selected_data(tf: Option<TwoFactor>) -> ApiResult<String> {
@ -938,176 +899,120 @@ fn _check_is_some<T>(value: &Option<T>, msg: &str) -> EmptyResult {
Ok(())
}
// Deprecated but still needed for Mobile apps
#[get("/account/prevalidate")]
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
fn prevalidate() -> JsonResult {
let claims = generate_ssotoken_claims();
let ssotoken = encode_jwt(&claims);
Ok(Json(json!({
"token": ssotoken,
})))
fn _prevalidate() -> JsonResult {
prevalidate()
}
use openidconnect::core::{CoreClient, CoreProviderMetadata, CoreResponseType, CoreUserInfoClaims};
use openidconnect::reqwest::async_http_client;
use openidconnect::{
AuthenticationFlow, AuthorizationCode, ClientId, ClientSecret, CsrfToken, IssuerUrl, Nonce, OAuth2TokenResponse,
RedirectUrl, Scope,
};
async fn get_client_from_sso_config() -> ApiResult<CoreClient> {
let redirect = CONFIG.sso_callback_path();
let client_id = ClientId::new(CONFIG.sso_client_id());
let client_secret = ClientSecret::new(CONFIG.sso_client_secret());
let issuer_url = match IssuerUrl::new(CONFIG.sso_authority()) {
Ok(issuer) => issuer,
Err(_err) => err!("invalid issuer URL"),
};
let provider_metadata = match CoreProviderMetadata::discover_async(issuer_url, async_http_client).await {
Ok(metadata) => metadata,
Err(_err) => {
err!("Failed to discover OpenID provider")
}
};
#[get("/sso/prevalidate")]
fn prevalidate() -> JsonResult {
if CONFIG.sso_enabled() {
let sso_token = sso::encode_ssotoken_claims();
Ok(Json(json!({
"token": sso_token,
})))
} else {
err!("SSO sign-in is not available")
}
}
let redirect_uri = match RedirectUrl::new(redirect) {
Ok(uri) => uri,
Err(err) => err!("Invalid redirection url: {}", err.to_string()),
};
let client = CoreClient::from_provider_metadata(provider_metadata, client_id, Some(client_secret))
.set_redirect_uri(redirect_uri);
#[get("/connect/oidc-signin?<code>&<state>", rank = 1)]
async fn oidcsignin(code: String, state: String, conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
oidcsignin_redirect(
state.clone(),
sso::OIDCCodeWrapper::Ok {
code,
state,
},
&conn,
)
.await
}
Ok(client)
// Bitwarden client appear to only care for code and state so we pipe it through
// cf: https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/8e46ef1ae5be8b62b0d3d0b9d1b1c62088a04638/libs/angular/src/auth/components/sso.component.ts#L68C11-L68C23)
#[get("/connect/oidc-signin?<state>&<error>&<error_description>", rank = 2)]
async fn oidcsignin_error(
state: String,
error: String,
error_description: Option<String>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
oidcsignin_redirect(
state.clone(),
sso::OIDCCodeWrapper::Error {
state,
error,
error_description,
},
&conn,
)
.await
}
#[get("/connect/oidc-signin?<code>")]
fn oidcsignin(code: String, jar: &CookieJar<'_>, _conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<CustomRedirect> {
let cookiemanager = CookieManager::new(jar);
// iss and scope parameters are needed for redirection to work on IOS.
async fn oidcsignin_redirect(state: String, wrapper: sso::OIDCCodeWrapper, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
let code = sso::encode_code_claims(wrapper);
let redirect_uri = match cookiemanager.get_cookie("redirect_uri".to_string()) {
None => err!("No redirect_uri in cookie"),
Some(uri) => uri,
let nonce = match SsoNonce::find(&state, conn).await {
Some(n) => n,
None => err!(format!("Failed to retrive redirect_uri with {state}")),
};
let orig_state = match cookiemanager.get_cookie("state".to_string()) {
None => err!("No state in cookie"),
Some(state) => state,
let mut url = match url::Url::parse(&nonce.redirect_uri) {
Ok(url) => url,
Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to parse redirect uri ({}): {err}", nonce.redirect_uri)),
};
cookiemanager.delete_cookie("redirect_uri".to_string());
cookiemanager.delete_cookie("state".to_string());
url.query_pairs_mut()
.append_pair("code", &code)
.append_pair("state", &state)
.append_pair("scope", &AuthMethod::Sso.scope())
.append_pair("iss", &CONFIG.domain());
let redirect = CustomRedirect {
url: format!("{redirect_uri}?code={code}&state={orig_state}"),
headers: vec![],
};
debug!("Redirection to {url}");
Ok(redirect)
Ok(Redirect::temporary(String::from(url)))
}
#[derive(FromForm)]
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, FromForm)]
struct AuthorizeData {
#[allow(unused)]
#[field(name = uncased("client_id"))]
#[field(name = uncased("clientid"))]
client_id: Option<String>,
client_id: String,
#[field(name = uncased("redirect_uri"))]
#[field(name = uncased("redirecturi"))]
redirect_uri: Option<String>,
redirect_uri: String,
#[allow(unused)]
#[field(name = uncased("response_type"))]
#[field(name = uncased("responsetype"))]
response_type: Option<String>,
#[allow(unused)]
#[field(name = uncased("scope"))]
scope: Option<String>,
#[field(name = uncased("state"))]
state: Option<String>,
state: String,
#[allow(unused)]
#[field(name = uncased("code_challenge"))]
code_challenge: Option<String>,
#[allow(unused)]
#[field(name = uncased("code_challenge_method"))]
code_challenge_method: Option<String>,
#[allow(unused)]
#[field(name = uncased("response_mode"))]
response_mode: Option<String>,
#[allow(unused)]
#[field(name = uncased("domain_hint"))]
domain_hint: Option<String>,
#[allow(unused)]
#[field(name = uncased("ssoToken"))]
ssoToken: Option<String>,
sso_token: Option<String>,
}
// The `redirect_uri` will change depending of the client (web, android, ios ..)
#[get("/connect/authorize?<data..>")]
async fn authorize(data: AuthorizeData, jar: &CookieJar<'_>, mut conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<CustomRedirect> {
let cookiemanager = CookieManager::new(jar);
match get_client_from_sso_config().await {
Ok(client) => {
let (auth_url, _csrf_state, nonce) = client
.authorize_url(
AuthenticationFlow::<CoreResponseType>::AuthorizationCode,
CsrfToken::new_random,
Nonce::new_random,
)
.add_scope(Scope::new("email".to_string()))
.add_scope(Scope::new("profile".to_string()))
.url();
let sso_nonce = SsoNonce::new(nonce.secret().to_string());
sso_nonce.save(&mut conn).await?;
let redirect_uri = match data.redirect_uri {
None => err!("No redirect_uri in data"),
Some(uri) => uri,
};
cookiemanager.set_cookie("redirect_uri".to_string(), redirect_uri);
let state = match data.state {
None => err!("No state in data"),
Some(state) => state,
};
cookiemanager.set_cookie("state".to_string(), state);
let redirect = CustomRedirect {
url: format!("{}", auth_url),
headers: vec![],
};
Ok(redirect)
}
Err(_err) => err!("Unable to find client from identifier"),
}
}
async fn get_auth_code_access_token(code: &str) -> ApiResult<(String, String, CoreUserInfoClaims)> {
let oidc_code = AuthorizationCode::new(String::from(code));
match get_client_from_sso_config().await {
Ok(client) => match client.exchange_code(oidc_code).request_async(async_http_client).await {
Ok(token_response) => {
let refresh_token = match token_response.refresh_token() {
Some(token) => token.secret().to_string(),
None => String::new(),
};
let id_token = match token_response.extra_fields().id_token() {
None => err!("Token response did not contain an id_token"),
Some(token) => token.to_string(),
};
async fn authorize(data: AuthorizeData, conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
let AuthorizeData {
client_id,
redirect_uri,
state,
..
} = data;
let user_info: CoreUserInfoClaims =
match client.user_info(token_response.access_token().to_owned(), None) {
Err(_err) => err!("Token response did not contain user_info"),
Ok(info) => match info.request_async(async_http_client).await {
Err(_err) => err!("Request to user_info endpoint failed"),
Ok(claim) => claim,
},
};
let auth_url = sso::authorize_url(state, &client_id, &redirect_uri, conn).await?;
Ok((refresh_token, id_token, user_info))
}
Err(err) => err!("Failed to contact token endpoint: {}", err.to_string()),
},
Err(_err) => err!("Unable to find client"),
}
Ok(Redirect::temporary(String::from(auth_url)))
}

@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ pub use crate::api::{
use crate::db::{models::User, DbConn};
// Type aliases for API methods results
type ApiResult<T> = Result<T, crate::error::Error>;
pub type ApiResult<T> = Result<T, crate::error::Error>;
pub type JsonResult = ApiResult<Json<Value>>;
pub type EmptyResult = ApiResult<()>;

@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
// JWT Handling
//
use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
use chrono::{DateTime, TimeDelta, Utc};
use jsonwebtoken::{errors::ErrorKind, Algorithm, DecodingKey, EncodingKey, Header};
use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
use once_cell::sync::{Lazy, OnceCell};
@ -14,18 +13,29 @@ use std::{
net::IpAddr,
};
use crate::{error::Error, CONFIG};
use crate::{
api::ApiResult,
db::{
models::{Collection, Device, User, UserOrgStatus, UserOrgType, UserOrganization, UserStampException},
DbConn,
},
error::Error,
sso, CONFIG,
};
const JWT_ALGORITHM: Algorithm = Algorithm::RS256;
pub static DEFAULT_VALIDITY: Lazy<TimeDelta> = Lazy::new(|| TimeDelta::try_hours(2).unwrap());
// Limit when BitWarden consider the token as expired
pub static BW_EXPIRATION: Lazy<TimeDelta> = Lazy::new(|| TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap());
pub static DEFAULT_REFRESH_VALIDITY: Lazy<TimeDelta> = Lazy::new(|| TimeDelta::try_days(30).unwrap());
pub static DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY: Lazy<TimeDelta> = Lazy::new(|| TimeDelta::try_hours(2).unwrap());
static JWT_HEADER: Lazy<Header> = Lazy::new(|| Header::new(JWT_ALGORITHM));
pub static JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER: Lazy<String> = Lazy::new(|| format!("{}|login", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
static JWT_INVITE_ISSUER: Lazy<String> = Lazy::new(|| format!("{}|invite", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
static JWT_EMERGENCY_ACCESS_INVITE_ISSUER: Lazy<String> =
Lazy::new(|| format!("{}|emergencyaccessinvite", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
static JWT_SSOTOKEN_ISSUER: Lazy<String> = Lazy::new(|| format!("{}|ssotoken", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
static JWT_DELETE_ISSUER: Lazy<String> = Lazy::new(|| format!("{}|delete", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
static JWT_VERIFYEMAIL_ISSUER: Lazy<String> = Lazy::new(|| format!("{}|verifyemail", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
static JWT_ADMIN_ISSUER: Lazy<String> = Lazy::new(|| format!("{}|admin", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
@ -87,7 +97,7 @@ pub fn encode_jwt<T: Serialize>(claims: &T) -> String {
}
}
fn decode_jwt<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, issuer: String) -> Result<T, Error> {
pub fn decode_jwt<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, issuer: String) -> Result<T, Error> {
let mut validation = jsonwebtoken::Validation::new(JWT_ALGORITHM);
validation.leeway = 30; // 30 seconds
validation.validate_exp = true;
@ -106,6 +116,10 @@ fn decode_jwt<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, issuer: String) -> Result<T, Err
}
}
pub fn decode_refresh(token: &str) -> Result<RefreshJwtClaims, Error> {
decode_jwt(token, JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER.to_string())
}
pub fn decode_login(token: &str) -> Result<LoginJwtClaims, Error> {
decode_jwt(token, JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER.to_string())
}
@ -179,6 +193,73 @@ pub struct LoginJwtClaims {
pub amr: Vec<String>,
}
impl LoginJwtClaims {
pub fn new(device: &Device, user: &User, nbf: i64, exp: i64, scope: Vec<String>, now: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
// ---
// Disabled these keys to be added to the JWT since they could cause the JWT to get too large
// Also These key/value pairs are not used anywhere by either Vaultwarden or Bitwarden Clients
// Because these might get used in the future, and they are added by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
// ---
// fn arg: orgs: Vec<super::UserOrganization>,
// ---
// let orgowner: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 0).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
// let orgadmin: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 1).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
// let orguser: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 2).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
// let orgmanager: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 3).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
if exp <= (now + *BW_EXPIRATION).timestamp() {
warn!("Raise access_token lifetime to more than 5min.")
}
// Create the JWT claims struct, to send to the client
Self {
nbf,
exp,
iss: JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub: user.uuid.clone(),
premium: true,
name: user.name.clone(),
email: user.email.clone(),
email_verified: !CONFIG.mail_enabled() || user.verified_at.is_some(),
// ---
// Disabled these keys to be added to the JWT since they could cause the JWT to get too large
// Also These key/value pairs are not used anywhere by either Vaultwarden or Bitwarden Clients
// Because these might get used in the future, and they are added by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
// See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/4156
// ---
// orgowner,
// orgadmin,
// orguser,
// orgmanager,
sstamp: user.security_stamp.clone(),
device: device.uuid.clone(),
scope,
amr: vec!["Application".into()],
}
}
pub fn default(device: &Device, user: &User, auth_method: &AuthMethod) -> Self {
let time_now = Utc::now();
Self::new(
device,
user,
time_now.timestamp(),
(time_now + *DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY).timestamp(),
auth_method.scope_vec(),
time_now,
)
}
pub fn token(&self) -> String {
encode_jwt(&self)
}
pub fn expires_in(&self) -> i64 {
self.exp - Utc::now().timestamp()
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct InviteJwtClaims {
// Not before
@ -332,28 +413,6 @@ pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> BasicJwtClaims {
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SsoTokenJwtClaims {
// Not before
pub nbf: i64,
// Expiration time
pub exp: i64,
// Issuer
pub iss: String,
// Subject
pub sub: String,
}
pub fn generate_ssotoken_claims() -> SsoTokenJwtClaims {
let time_now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
SsoTokenJwtClaims {
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
exp: (time_now + Duration::minutes(2)).timestamp(),
iss: JWT_SSOTOKEN_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub: "vaultwarden".to_string(),
}
}
pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(uuid: String) -> BasicJwtClaims {
let time_now = Utc::now();
let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
@ -393,11 +452,6 @@ use rocket::{
request::{FromRequest, Outcome, Request},
};
use crate::db::{
models::{Collection, Device, User, UserOrgStatus, UserOrgType, UserOrganization, UserStampException},
DbConn,
};
pub struct Host {
pub host: String,
}
@ -923,3 +977,150 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for WsAccessTokenHeader {
})
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Ord, PartialOrd, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum AuthMethod {
OrgApiKey,
Password,
Sso,
UserApiKey,
}
pub trait AuthMethodScope {
fn scope_vec(&self) -> Vec<String>;
fn scope(&self) -> String;
fn check_scope(&self, scope: Option<&String>) -> ApiResult<String>;
}
impl AuthMethodScope for AuthMethod {
fn scope(&self) -> String {
match self {
AuthMethod::OrgApiKey => "api.organization".to_string(),
AuthMethod::Password => "api offline_access".to_string(),
AuthMethod::Sso => "api offline_access".to_string(),
AuthMethod::UserApiKey => "api".to_string(),
}
}
fn scope_vec(&self) -> Vec<String> {
self.scope().split_whitespace().map(str::to_string).collect()
}
fn check_scope(&self, scope: Option<&String>) -> ApiResult<String> {
let method_scope = self.scope();
match scope {
None => err!("Missing scope"),
Some(scope) if scope == &method_scope => Ok(method_scope),
Some(scope) => err!(format!("Scope ({scope}) not supported")),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum TokenWrapper {
Access(String),
Refresh(String),
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RefreshJwtClaims {
// Not before
pub nbf: i64,
// Expiration time
pub exp: i64,
// Issuer
pub iss: String,
// Subject
pub sub: AuthMethod,
pub device_token: String,
pub token: Option<TokenWrapper>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AuthTokens {
pub refresh_claims: RefreshJwtClaims,
pub access_claims: LoginJwtClaims,
}
impl AuthTokens {
pub fn refresh_token(&self) -> String {
encode_jwt(&self.refresh_claims)
}
pub fn access_token(&self) -> String {
self.access_claims.token()
}
pub fn expires_in(&self) -> i64 {
self.access_claims.expires_in()
}
pub fn scope(&self) -> String {
self.refresh_claims.sub.scope()
}
// Create refresh_token and access_token with default validity
pub fn new(device: &Device, user: &User, sub: AuthMethod) -> Self {
let time_now = Utc::now();
let access_claims = LoginJwtClaims::default(device, user, &sub);
let refresh_claims = RefreshJwtClaims {
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
exp: (time_now + *DEFAULT_REFRESH_VALIDITY).timestamp(),
iss: JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub,
device_token: device.refresh_token.clone(),
token: None,
};
Self {
refresh_claims,
access_claims,
}
}
}
pub async fn refresh_tokens(refresh_token: &str, conn: &mut DbConn) -> ApiResult<(Device, AuthTokens)> {
let time_now = Utc::now();
let refresh_claims = match decode_refresh(refresh_token) {
Err(err) => err_silent!(format!("Impossible to read refresh_token: {}", err.message())),
Ok(claims) => claims,
};
// Get device by refresh token
let mut device = match Device::find_by_refresh_token(&refresh_claims.device_token, conn).await {
None => err!("Invalid refresh token"),
Some(device) => device,
};
// Roll the Device.refresh_token this way it invalides old JWT refresh_token
device.roll_refresh_token();
device.save(conn).await?;
let user = match User::find_by_uuid(&device.user_uuid, conn).await {
None => err!("Impossible to find user"),
Some(user) => user,
};
if refresh_claims.exp < time_now.timestamp() {
err!("Expired refresh token");
}
let auth_tokens = match refresh_claims.sub {
AuthMethod::Sso if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_auth_only_not_session() => {
AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, refresh_claims.sub)
}
AuthMethod::Sso if CONFIG.sso_enabled() => sso::exchange_refresh_token(&device, &user, &refresh_claims).await?,
AuthMethod::Sso => err!("SSO is now disabled, Login again using email and master password"),
AuthMethod::Password if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() => err!("SSO is now required, Login again"),
AuthMethod::Password => AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, refresh_claims.sub),
_ => err!("Invalid auth method, cannot refresh token"),
};
Ok((device, auth_tokens))
}

@ -423,6 +423,9 @@ make_config! {
/// Duo Auth context cleanup schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that cleans expired Duo contexts from the database. Does nothing if Duo MFA is disabled or set to use the legacy iframe prompt.
/// Defaults to once every minute. Set blank to disable this job.
duo_context_purge_schedule: String, false, def, "30 * * * * *".to_string();
/// Purge incomplete sso nonce. |> Cron schedule of the job that cleans leftover nonce in db due to incomplete sso login.
/// Defaults to daily. Set blank to disable this job.
purge_incomplete_sso_nonce: String, false, def, "0 20 0 * * *".to_string();
},
/// General settings
@ -640,19 +643,35 @@ make_config! {
/// OpenID Connect SSO settings
sso {
/// Enabled
sso_enabled: bool, true, def, false;
/// Force SSO login
sso_only: bool, true, def, false;
sso_enabled: bool, false, def, false;
/// Only sso login |> Disable Email+Master Password login
sso_only: bool, true, def, false;
/// Allow email association |> Associate existing non-sso user based on email
sso_signups_match_email: bool, true, def, true;
/// Client ID
sso_client_id: String, true, def, String::new();
sso_client_id: String, false, def, String::new();
/// Client Key
sso_client_secret: Pass, true, def, String::new();
/// Authority Server
sso_authority: String, true, def, String::new();
/// CallBack Path
sso_callback_path: String, false, gen, |c| generate_sso_callback_path(&c.domain);
/// Allow workaround so SSO logins accept all invites
sso_acceptall_invites: bool, true, def, false;
sso_client_secret: Pass, false, def, String::new();
/// Authority Server |> Base url of the OIDC provider discovery endpoint (without `/.well-known/openid-configuration`)
sso_authority: String, false, def, String::new();
/// Authorization request scopes |> List the of the needed scope (`openid` is implicit)
sso_scopes: String, false, def, "email profile".to_string();
/// Authorization request extra parameters
sso_authorize_extra_params: String, false, def, String::new();
/// Use PKCE during Authorization flow
sso_pkce: bool, false, def, false;
/// Regex for additionnal trusted Id token audience |> By default only the client_id is trsuted.
sso_audience_trusted: String, false, option;
/// CallBack Path |> Generated from Domain.
sso_callback_path: String, false, generated, |c| generate_sso_callback_path(&c.domain);
/// Optional sso master password policy |> Ex format: '{"enforceOnLogin":false,"minComplexity":3,"minLength":12,"requireLower":false,"requireNumbers":false,"requireSpecial":false,"requireUpper":false}'
sso_master_password_policy: String, true, option;
/// Use sso only for auth not the session lifecycle |> Use default Vaultwarden session lifecycle (Idle refresh token valid for 30days)
sso_auth_only_not_session: bool, true, def, false;
/// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 or less to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/blob/sso-support/SSO.md#client-cache
sso_client_cache_expiration: u64, true, def, 0;
/// Log all tokens |> `LOG_LEVEL=debug` or `LOG_LEVEL=info,vaultwarden::sso=debug` is required
sso_debug_tokens: bool, true, def, false;
},
/// Yubikey settings
@ -866,10 +885,15 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems) -> Result<(), Error> {
err!("All Duo options need to be set for global Duo support")
}
if cfg.sso_enabled
&& (cfg.sso_client_id.is_empty() || cfg.sso_client_secret.is_empty() || cfg.sso_authority.is_empty())
{
err!("`SSO_CLIENT_ID`, `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET` and `SSO_AUTHORITY` must be set for SSO support")
if cfg.sso_enabled {
if cfg.sso_client_id.is_empty() || cfg.sso_client_secret.is_empty() || cfg.sso_authority.is_empty() {
err!("`SSO_CLIENT_ID`, `SSO_CLIENT_SECRET` and `SSO_AUTHORITY` must be set for SSO support")
}
internal_sso_issuer_url(&cfg.sso_authority)?;
internal_sso_redirect_url(&cfg.sso_callback_path)?;
check_master_password_policy(&cfg.sso_master_password_policy)?;
internal_sso_authorize_extra_params_vec(&cfg.sso_authorize_extra_params)?;
}
if cfg._enable_yubico {
@ -1049,6 +1073,35 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems) -> Result<(), Error> {
Ok(())
}
fn internal_sso_issuer_url(sso_authority: &String) -> Result<openidconnect::IssuerUrl, Error> {
match openidconnect::IssuerUrl::new(sso_authority.clone()) {
Err(err) => err!(format!("Invalid sso_authority UR ({sso_authority}): {err}")),
Ok(issuer_url) => Ok(issuer_url),
}
}
fn internal_sso_redirect_url(sso_callback_path: &String) -> Result<openidconnect::RedirectUrl, Error> {
match openidconnect::RedirectUrl::new(sso_callback_path.clone()) {
Err(err) => err!(format!("Invalid sso_callback_path ({sso_callback_path} built using `domain`) URL: {err}")),
Ok(redirect_url) => Ok(redirect_url),
}
}
fn internal_sso_authorize_extra_params_vec(config: &str) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>, Error> {
match parse_param_list(config.to_owned(), '&', '=') {
Err(e) => err!(format!("Invalid SSO_AUTHORIZE_EXTRA_PARAMS: {e}")),
Ok(params) => Ok(params),
}
}
fn check_master_password_policy(sso_master_password_policy: &Option<String>) -> Result<(), Error> {
let policy = sso_master_password_policy.as_ref().map(|mpp| serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(mpp));
if let Some(Err(error)) = policy {
err!(format!("Invalid sso_master_password_policy ({error}), Ensure that it's correctly escaped with ''"))
}
Ok(())
}
/// Extracts an RFC 6454 web origin from a URL.
fn extract_url_origin(url: &str) -> String {
match Url::parse(url) {
@ -1126,6 +1179,26 @@ fn smtp_convert_deprecated_ssl_options(smtp_ssl: Option<bool>, smtp_explicit_tls
"starttls".to_string()
}
/// Allow to parse a list of Key/Values (Ex: `key1=value&key2=value2`)
/// - line break are handled as `separator`
fn parse_param_list(config: String, separator: char, kv_separator: char) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>, Error> {
config
.lines()
.flat_map(|l| l.split(separator))
.map(|l| l.trim())
.filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
.map(|l| {
let split = l.split(kv_separator).collect::<Vec<&str>>();
match &split[..] {
[key, value] => Ok(((*key).to_string(), (*value).to_string())),
_ => {
err!(format!("Failed to parse ({l}). Expected key{kv_separator}value"))
}
}
})
.collect()
}
impl Config {
pub fn load() -> Result<Self, Error> {
// Loading from env and file
@ -1313,6 +1386,22 @@ impl Config {
}
}
}
pub fn sso_issuer_url(&self) -> Result<openidconnect::IssuerUrl, Error> {
internal_sso_issuer_url(&self.sso_authority())
}
pub fn sso_redirect_url(&self) -> Result<openidconnect::RedirectUrl, Error> {
internal_sso_redirect_url(&self.sso_callback_path())
}
pub fn sso_scopes_vec(&self) -> Vec<String> {
self.sso_scopes().split_whitespace().map(str::to_string).collect()
}
pub fn sso_authorize_extra_params_vec(&self) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>, Error> {
internal_sso_authorize_extra_params_vec(&self.sso_authorize_extra_params())
}
}
use handlebars::{
@ -1370,6 +1459,7 @@ where
reg!("email/send_single_org_removed_from_org", ".html");
reg!("email/set_password", ".html");
reg!("email/smtp_test", ".html");
reg!("email/sso_change_email", ".html");
reg!("email/twofactor_email", ".html");
reg!("email/verify_email", ".html");
reg!("email/welcome_must_verify", ".html");
@ -1426,3 +1516,54 @@ fn to_json<'reg, 'rc>(
out.write(&json)?;
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_parse_param_list() {
let config = "key1=value&key2=value2&".to_string();
let parsed = parse_param_list(config, '&', '=');
assert_eq!(
parsed.unwrap(),
vec![("key1".to_string(), "value".to_string()), ("key2".to_string(), "value2".to_string())]
);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_param_list_lines() {
let config = r#"
key1=value
key2=value2
"#
.to_string();
let parsed = parse_param_list(config, '&', '=');
assert_eq!(
parsed.unwrap(),
vec![("key1".to_string(), "value".to_string()), ("key2".to_string(), "value2".to_string())]
);
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_param_list_mixed() {
let config = r#"key1=value&key2=value2&
&key3=value3&&
&key4=value4
"#
.to_string();
let parsed = parse_param_list(config, '&', '=');
assert_eq!(
parsed.unwrap(),
vec![
("key1".to_string(), "value".to_string()),
("key2".to_string(), "value2".to_string()),
("key3".to_string(), "value3".to_string()),
("key4".to_string(), "value4".to_string()),
]
);
}
}

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
use data_encoding::{BASE64, BASE64URL};
use crate::{crypto, CONFIG};
use crate::crypto;
use core::fmt;
db_object! {
@ -42,13 +43,16 @@ impl Device {
push_uuid: None,
push_token: None,
refresh_token: String::new(),
refresh_token: crypto::encode_random_bytes::<64>(BASE64URL),
twofactor_remember: None,
}
}
pub fn roll_refresh_token(&mut self) {
self.refresh_token = crypto::encode_random_bytes::<64>(BASE64URL)
}
pub fn refresh_twofactor_remember(&mut self) -> String {
use data_encoding::BASE64;
let twofactor_remember = crypto::encode_random_bytes::<180>(BASE64);
self.twofactor_remember = Some(twofactor_remember.clone());
@ -59,61 +63,6 @@ impl Device {
self.twofactor_remember = None;
}
pub fn refresh_tokens(&mut self, user: &super::User, scope: Vec<String>) -> (String, i64) {
// If there is no refresh token, we create one
if self.refresh_token.is_empty() {
use data_encoding::BASE64URL;
self.refresh_token = crypto::encode_random_bytes::<64>(BASE64URL);
}
// Update the expiration of the device and the last update date
let time_now = Utc::now();
self.updated_at = time_now.naive_utc();
// ---
// Disabled these keys to be added to the JWT since they could cause the JWT to get too large
// Also These key/value pairs are not used anywhere by either Vaultwarden or Bitwarden Clients
// Because these might get used in the future, and they are added by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
// ---
// fn arg: orgs: Vec<super::UserOrganization>,
// ---
// let orgowner: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 0).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
// let orgadmin: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 1).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
// let orguser: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 2).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
// let orgmanager: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 3).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
// Create the JWT claims struct, to send to the client
use crate::auth::{encode_jwt, LoginJwtClaims, DEFAULT_VALIDITY, JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER};
let claims = LoginJwtClaims {
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
exp: (time_now + *DEFAULT_VALIDITY).timestamp(),
iss: JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub: user.uuid.clone(),
premium: true,
name: user.name.clone(),
email: user.email.clone(),
email_verified: !CONFIG.mail_enabled() || user.verified_at.is_some(),
// ---
// Disabled these keys to be added to the JWT since they could cause the JWT to get too large
// Also These key/value pairs are not used anywhere by either Vaultwarden or Bitwarden Clients
// Because these might get used in the future, and they are added by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
// See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/4156
// ---
// orgowner,
// orgadmin,
// orguser,
// orgmanager,
sstamp: user.security_stamp.clone(),
device: self.uuid.clone(),
scope,
amr: vec!["Application".into()],
};
(encode_jwt(&claims), DEFAULT_VALIDITY.num_seconds())
}
pub fn is_push_device(&self) -> bool {
matches!(DeviceType::from_i32(self.atype), DeviceType::Android | DeviceType::Ios)
}

@ -34,4 +34,4 @@ pub use self::sso_nonce::SsoNonce;
pub use self::two_factor::{TwoFactor, TwoFactorType};
pub use self::two_factor_duo_context::TwoFactorDuoContext;
pub use self::two_factor_incomplete::TwoFactorIncomplete;
pub use self::user::{Invitation, User, UserKdfType, UserStampException};
pub use self::user::{Invitation, SsoUser, User, UserKdfType, UserStampException};

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ pub enum OrgPolicyType {
MasterPassword = 1,
PasswordGenerator = 2,
SingleOrg = 3,
RequireSso = 4,
// RequireSso = 4, // Not supported
PersonalOwnership = 5,
DisableSend = 6,
SendOptions = 7,
@ -77,12 +77,11 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
}
pub fn to_json(&self) -> Value {
let data_json: Value = serde_json::from_str(&self.data).unwrap_or(Value::Null);
json!({
"id": self.uuid,
"organizationId": self.org_uuid,
"type": self.atype,
"data": data_json,
"data": serde_json::from_str(&self.data).unwrap_or(Value::Null),
"enabled": self.enabled,
"object": "policy",
})

@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ db_object! {
pub uuid: String,
pub user_uuid: String,
pub org_uuid: String,
pub invited_by_email: Option<String>,
pub access_all: bool,
pub akey: String,
@ -170,9 +171,9 @@ impl Organization {
"useGroups": CONFIG.org_groups_enabled(),
"useTotp": true,
"usePolicies": true,
// "UseScim": false, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
"useSso": CONFIG.sso_enabled(),
// "UseKeyConnector": false, // Not supported
// "useScim": false, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
"useSso": false, // Not supported
// "useKeyConnector": false, // Not supported
"selfHost": true,
"useApi": true,
"hasPublicAndPrivateKeys": self.private_key.is_some() && self.public_key.is_some(),
@ -200,12 +201,13 @@ impl Organization {
static ACTIVATE_REVOKE_DIFF: i32 = 128;
impl UserOrganization {
pub fn new(user_uuid: String, org_uuid: String) -> Self {
pub fn new(user_uuid: String, org_uuid: String, invited_by_email: Option<String>) -> Self {
Self {
uuid: crate::util::get_uuid(),
user_uuid,
org_uuid,
invited_by_email,
access_all: false,
akey: String::new(),
@ -396,7 +398,7 @@ impl UserOrganization {
"resetPasswordEnrolled": self.reset_password_key.is_some(),
"useResetPassword": CONFIG.mail_enabled(),
"ssoBound": false, // Not supported
"useSso": CONFIG.sso_enabled(),
"useSso": false, // Not supported
"useKeyConnector": false,
"useSecretsManager": false,
"usePasswordManager": true,
@ -724,6 +726,17 @@ impl UserOrganization {
}}
}
pub async fn confirm_user_invitations(user_uuid: &str, conn: &mut DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
db_run! { conn: {
diesel::update(users_organizations::table)
.filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(UserOrgStatus::Invited as i32))
.set(users_organizations::status.eq(UserOrgStatus::Accepted as i32))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error confirming invitations")
}}
}
pub async fn find_any_state_by_user(user_uuid: &str, conn: &mut DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
db_run! { conn: {
users_organizations::table

@ -1,21 +1,34 @@
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
use crate::api::EmptyResult;
use crate::db::DbConn;
use crate::db::{DbConn, DbPool};
use crate::error::MapResult;
use crate::sso::NONCE_EXPIRATION;
db_object! {
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable)]
#[diesel(table_name = sso_nonce)]
#[diesel(primary_key(nonce))]
#[diesel(primary_key(state))]
pub struct SsoNonce {
pub state: String,
pub nonce: String,
pub verifier: Option<String>,
pub redirect_uri: String,
pub created_at: NaiveDateTime,
}
}
/// Local methods
impl SsoNonce {
pub fn new(nonce: String) -> Self {
Self {
pub fn new(state: String, nonce: String, verifier: Option<String>, redirect_uri: String) -> Self {
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
SsoNonce {
state,
nonce,
verifier,
redirect_uri,
created_at: now,
}
}
}
@ -28,7 +41,7 @@ impl SsoNonce {
diesel::replace_into(sso_nonce::table)
.values(SsoNonceDb::to_db(self))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving SSO device")
.map_res("Error saving SSO nonce")
}
postgresql {
let value = SsoNonceDb::to_db(self);
@ -40,21 +53,37 @@ impl SsoNonce {
}
}
pub async fn delete(self, conn: &mut DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
pub async fn delete(state: &str, conn: &mut DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
db_run! { conn: {
diesel::delete(sso_nonce::table.filter(sso_nonce::nonce.eq(self.nonce)))
diesel::delete(sso_nonce::table.filter(sso_nonce::state.eq(state)))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error deleting SSO nonce")
}}
}
pub async fn find(nonce: &str, conn: &mut DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
pub async fn find(state: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
let oldest = Utc::now().naive_utc() - *NONCE_EXPIRATION;
db_run! { conn: {
sso_nonce::table
.filter(sso_nonce::nonce.eq(nonce))
.filter(sso_nonce::state.eq(state))
.filter(sso_nonce::created_at.ge(oldest))
.first::<SsoNonceDb>(conn)
.ok()
.from_db()
}}
}
pub async fn delete_expired(pool: DbPool) -> EmptyResult {
debug!("Purging expired sso_nonce");
if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
let oldest = Utc::now().naive_utc() - *NONCE_EXPIRATION;
db_run! { conn: {
diesel::delete(sso_nonce::table.filter(sso_nonce::created_at.lt(oldest)))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error deleting expired SSO nonce")
}}
} else {
err!("Failed to get DB connection while purging expired sso_nonce")
}
}
}

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use crate::crypto;
use crate::CONFIG;
db_object! {
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = users)]
#[diesel(treat_none_as_null = true)]
#[diesel(primary_key(uuid))]
@ -61,6 +61,14 @@ db_object! {
pub struct Invitation {
pub email: String,
}
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = sso_users)]
#[diesel(primary_key(user_uuid))]
pub struct SsoUser {
pub user_uuid: String,
pub identifier: String,
}
}
pub enum UserKdfType {
@ -86,7 +94,7 @@ impl User {
pub const CLIENT_KDF_TYPE_DEFAULT: i32 = UserKdfType::Pbkdf2 as i32;
pub const CLIENT_KDF_ITER_DEFAULT: i32 = 600_000;
pub fn new(email: String) -> Self {
pub fn new(email: String, name: Option<String>) -> Self {
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
let email = email.to_lowercase();
@ -98,7 +106,7 @@ impl User {
verified_at: None,
last_verifying_at: None,
login_verify_count: 0,
name: email.clone(),
name: name.unwrap_or(email.clone()),
email,
akey: String::new(),
email_new: None,
@ -458,3 +466,51 @@ impl Invitation {
}
}
}
impl SsoUser {
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &mut DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
diesel::replace_into(sso_users::table)
.values(SsoUserDb::to_db(self))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving SSO user")
}
postgresql {
let value = SsoUserDb::to_db(self);
diesel::insert_into(sso_users::table)
.values(&value)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving SSO user")
}
}
}
// Written as an union to make the query more lisible than using an `or_filter`.
// But `first()` does not appear to work with `union()` so we use `load()`.
pub async fn find_by_identifier_or_email(
identifier: &str,
mail: &str,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> Option<(User, Option<SsoUser>)> {
let lower_mail = mail.to_lowercase();
db_run! {conn: {
users::table
.inner_join(sso_users::table)
.select(<(UserDb, Option<SsoUserDb>)>::as_select())
.filter(sso_users::identifier.eq(identifier))
.union(
users::table
.left_join(sso_users::table)
.select(<(UserDb, Option<SsoUserDb>)>::as_select())
.filter(users::email.eq(lower_mail))
)
.load(conn)
.expect("Error searching user by SSO identifier and email")
.into_iter()
.next()
.map(|(user, sso_user)| { (user.from_db(), sso_user.from_db()) })
}}
}
}

@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ table! {
uuid -> Text,
user_uuid -> Text,
org_uuid -> Text,
invited_by_email -> Nullable<Text>,
access_all -> Bool,
akey -> Text,
status -> Integer,
@ -254,8 +255,19 @@ table! {
}
table! {
sso_nonce (nonce) {
sso_nonce (state) {
state -> Text,
nonce -> Text,
verifier -> Nullable<Text>,
redirect_uri -> Text,
created_at -> Timestamp,
}
}
table! {
sso_users (user_uuid) {
user_uuid -> Text,
identifier -> Text,
}
}
@ -352,6 +364,7 @@ joinable!(collections_groups -> collections (collections_uuid));
joinable!(collections_groups -> groups (groups_uuid));
joinable!(event -> users_organizations (uuid));
joinable!(auth_requests -> users (user_uuid));
joinable!(sso_users -> users (user_uuid));
allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
attachments,
@ -365,6 +378,7 @@ allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
org_policies,
organizations,
sends,
sso_users,
twofactor,
users,
users_collections,

@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ table! {
uuid -> Text,
user_uuid -> Text,
org_uuid -> Text,
invited_by_email -> Nullable<Text>,
access_all -> Bool,
akey -> Text,
status -> Integer,
@ -254,8 +255,19 @@ table! {
}
table! {
sso_nonce (nonce) {
sso_nonce (state) {
state -> Text,
nonce -> Text,
verifier -> Nullable<Text>,
redirect_uri -> Text,
created_at -> Timestamp,
}
}
table! {
sso_users (user_uuid) {
user_uuid -> Text,
identifier -> Text,
}
}
@ -352,6 +364,7 @@ joinable!(collections_groups -> collections (collections_uuid));
joinable!(collections_groups -> groups (groups_uuid));
joinable!(event -> users_organizations (uuid));
joinable!(auth_requests -> users (user_uuid));
joinable!(sso_users -> users (user_uuid));
allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
attachments,
@ -365,6 +378,7 @@ allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
org_policies,
organizations,
sends,
sso_users,
twofactor,
users,
users_collections,

@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ table! {
uuid -> Text,
user_uuid -> Text,
org_uuid -> Text,
invited_by_email -> Nullable<Text>,
access_all -> Bool,
akey -> Text,
status -> Integer,
@ -254,8 +255,19 @@ table! {
}
table! {
sso_nonce (nonce) {
sso_nonce (state) {
state -> Text,
nonce -> Text,
verifier -> Nullable<Text>,
redirect_uri -> Text,
created_at -> Timestamp,
}
}
table! {
sso_users (user_uuid) {
user_uuid -> Text,
identifier -> Text,
}
}
@ -352,6 +364,7 @@ joinable!(collections_groups -> collections (collections_uuid));
joinable!(collections_groups -> groups (groups_uuid));
joinable!(event -> users_organizations (uuid));
joinable!(auth_requests -> users (user_uuid));
joinable!(sso_users -> users (user_uuid));
allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
attachments,
@ -365,6 +378,7 @@ allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
org_policies,
organizations,
sends,
sso_users,
twofactor,
users,
users_collections,

@ -147,6 +147,10 @@ impl Error {
pub fn get_event(&self) -> &Option<ErrorEvent> {
&self.event
}
pub fn message(&self) -> &str {
&self.message
}
}
pub trait MapResult<S> {

@ -281,7 +281,11 @@ pub async fn send_invite(
.append_pair("organizationId", org_id.as_deref().unwrap_or("_"))
.append_pair("organizationUserId", org_user_id.as_deref().unwrap_or("_"))
.append_pair("token", &invite_token);
if user.private_key.is_some() {
if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() {
query_params.append_pair("orgUserHasExistingUser", "false");
query_params.append_pair("orgSsoIdentifier", org_name);
} else if user.private_key.is_some() {
query_params.append_pair("orgUserHasExistingUser", "true");
}
}
@ -552,6 +556,18 @@ pub async fn send_change_email(address: &str, token: &str) -> EmptyResult {
send_email(address, &subject, body_html, body_text).await
}
pub async fn send_sso_change_email(address: &str) -> EmptyResult {
let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
"email/sso_change_email",
json!({
"url": format!("{}/#/settings/account", CONFIG.domain()),
"img_src": CONFIG._smtp_img_src(),
}),
)?;
send_email(address, &subject, body_html, body_text).await
}
pub async fn send_set_password(address: &str, user_name: &str) -> EmptyResult {
let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
"email/set_password",

@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ mod db;
mod http_client;
mod mail;
mod ratelimit;
mod sso;
mod util;
use crate::api::core::two_factor::duo_oidc::purge_duo_contexts;
@ -702,6 +703,13 @@ fn schedule_jobs(pool: db::DbPool) {
}));
}
// Purge sso nonce from incomplete flow (default to daily at 00h20).
if !CONFIG.purge_incomplete_sso_nonce().is_empty() {
sched.add(Job::new(CONFIG.purge_incomplete_sso_nonce().parse().unwrap(), || {
runtime.spawn(db::models::SsoNonce::delete_expired(pool.clone()));
}));
}
// Periodically check for jobs to run. We probably won't need any
// jobs that run more often than once a minute, so a default poll
// interval of 30 seconds should be sufficient. Users who want to

@ -0,0 +1,544 @@
use chrono::Utc;
use regex::Regex;
use std::borrow::Cow;
use std::time::Duration;
use url::Url;
use mini_moka::sync::Cache;
use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
use openidconnect::core::{
CoreClient, CoreIdTokenVerifier, CoreProviderMetadata, CoreResponseType, CoreUserInfoClaims,
};
use openidconnect::reqwest::async_http_client;
use openidconnect::{
AccessToken, AuthDisplay, AuthPrompt, AuthenticationFlow, AuthorizationCode, AuthorizationRequest, ClientId,
ClientSecret, CsrfToken, Nonce, OAuth2TokenResponse, PkceCodeChallenge, PkceCodeVerifier, RefreshToken,
ResponseType, Scope,
};
use crate::{
api::ApiResult,
auth,
auth::{AuthMethod, AuthMethodScope, AuthTokens, TokenWrapper, BW_EXPIRATION, DEFAULT_REFRESH_VALIDITY},
db::{
models::{Device, SsoNonce, User},
DbConn,
},
CONFIG,
};
static AC_CACHE: Lazy<Cache<String, AuthenticatedUser>> =
Lazy::new(|| Cache::builder().max_capacity(1000).time_to_live(Duration::from_secs(10 * 60)).build());
static CLIENT_CACHE_KEY: Lazy<String> = Lazy::new(|| "sso-client".to_string());
static CLIENT_CACHE: Lazy<Cache<String, CoreClient>> = Lazy::new(|| {
Cache::builder().max_capacity(1).time_to_live(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.sso_client_cache_expiration())).build()
});
static SSO_JWT_ISSUER: Lazy<String> = Lazy::new(|| format!("{}|sso", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
pub static NONCE_EXPIRATION: Lazy<chrono::Duration> = Lazy::new(|| chrono::TimeDelta::try_minutes(10).unwrap());
trait AuthorizationRequestExt<'a> {
fn add_extra_params<N: Into<Cow<'a, str>>, V: Into<Cow<'a, str>>>(self, params: Vec<(N, V)>) -> Self;
}
impl<'a, AD: AuthDisplay, P: AuthPrompt, RT: ResponseType> AuthorizationRequestExt<'a>
for AuthorizationRequest<'a, AD, P, RT>
{
fn add_extra_params<N: Into<Cow<'a, str>>, V: Into<Cow<'a, str>>>(mut self, params: Vec<(N, V)>) -> Self {
for (key, value) in params {
self = self.add_extra_param(key, value);
}
self
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct SsoTokenJwtClaims {
// Not before
pub nbf: i64,
// Expiration time
pub exp: i64,
// Issuer
pub iss: String,
// Subject
pub sub: String,
}
pub fn encode_ssotoken_claims() -> String {
let time_now = Utc::now();
let claims = SsoTokenJwtClaims {
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
exp: (time_now + chrono::TimeDelta::try_minutes(2).unwrap()).timestamp(),
iss: SSO_JWT_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub: "vaultwarden".to_string(),
};
auth::encode_jwt(&claims)
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum OIDCCodeWrapper {
Ok {
code: String,
state: String,
},
Error {
state: String,
error: String,
error_description: Option<String>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct OIDCCodeClaims {
// Expiration time
pub exp: i64,
// Issuer
pub iss: String,
pub code: OIDCCodeWrapper,
}
pub fn encode_code_claims(code: OIDCCodeWrapper) -> String {
let time_now = Utc::now();
let claims = OIDCCodeClaims {
exp: (time_now + chrono::TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap()).timestamp(),
iss: SSO_JWT_ISSUER.to_string(),
code,
};
auth::encode_jwt(&claims)
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct BasicTokenClaims {
iat: Option<i64>,
nbf: Option<i64>,
exp: i64,
}
impl BasicTokenClaims {
fn nbf(&self) -> i64 {
self.nbf.or(self.iat).unwrap_or_else(|| Utc::now().timestamp())
}
}
fn decode_token_claims(token_name: &str, token: &str) -> ApiResult<BasicTokenClaims> {
let mut validation = jsonwebtoken::Validation::default();
validation.set_issuer(&[CONFIG.sso_authority()]);
validation.insecure_disable_signature_validation();
validation.validate_aud = false;
match jsonwebtoken::decode(token, &jsonwebtoken::DecodingKey::from_secret(&[]), &validation) {
Ok(btc) => Ok(btc.claims),
Err(err) => err_silent!(format!("Failed to decode basic token claims from {token_name}: {err}")),
}
}
#[rocket::async_trait]
trait CoreClientExt {
async fn _get_client() -> ApiResult<CoreClient>;
async fn cached() -> ApiResult<CoreClient>;
async fn user_info_async(&self, access_token: AccessToken) -> ApiResult<CoreUserInfoClaims>;
fn vw_id_token_verifier(&self) -> CoreIdTokenVerifier<'_>;
}
#[rocket::async_trait]
impl CoreClientExt for CoreClient {
// Call the OpenId discovery endpoint to retrieve configuration
async fn _get_client() -> ApiResult<CoreClient> {
let client_id = ClientId::new(CONFIG.sso_client_id());
let client_secret = ClientSecret::new(CONFIG.sso_client_secret());
let issuer_url = CONFIG.sso_issuer_url()?;
let provider_metadata = match CoreProviderMetadata::discover_async(issuer_url, async_http_client).await {
Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to discover OpenID provider: {err}")),
Ok(metadata) => metadata,
};
Ok(CoreClient::from_provider_metadata(provider_metadata, client_id, Some(client_secret))
.set_redirect_uri(CONFIG.sso_redirect_url()?))
}
// Simple cache to prevent recalling the discovery endpoint each time
async fn cached() -> ApiResult<CoreClient> {
if CONFIG.sso_client_cache_expiration() > 0 {
match CLIENT_CACHE.get(&*CLIENT_CACHE_KEY) {
Some(client) => Ok(client),
None => Self::_get_client().await.inspect(|client| {
debug!("Inserting new client in cache");
CLIENT_CACHE.insert(CLIENT_CACHE_KEY.clone(), client.clone());
}),
}
} else {
Self::_get_client().await
}
}
async fn user_info_async(&self, access_token: AccessToken) -> ApiResult<CoreUserInfoClaims> {
let endpoint = match self.user_info(access_token, None) {
Err(err) => err!(format!("No user_info endpoint: {err}")),
Ok(endpoint) => endpoint,
};
match endpoint.request_async(async_http_client).await {
Err(err) => err!(format!("Request to user_info endpoint failed: {err}")),
Ok(user_info) => Ok(user_info),
}
}
fn vw_id_token_verifier(&self) -> CoreIdTokenVerifier<'_> {
let mut verifier = self.id_token_verifier();
if let Some(regex_str) = CONFIG.sso_audience_trusted() {
match Regex::new(&regex_str) {
Ok(regex) => {
verifier = verifier.set_other_audience_verifier_fn(move |aud| regex.is_match(aud));
}
Err(err) => {
error!("Failed to parse SSO_AUDIENCE_TRUSTED={regex_str} regex: {err}");
}
}
}
verifier
}
}
// The `nonce` allow to protect against replay attacks
// redirect_uri from: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Identity/IdentityServer/ApiClient.cs
pub async fn authorize_url(state: String, client_id: &str, raw_redirect_uri: &str, mut conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<Url> {
let scopes = CONFIG.sso_scopes_vec().into_iter().map(Scope::new);
let redirect_uri = match client_id {
"web" | "browser" => format!("{}/sso-connector.html", CONFIG.domain()),
"desktop" | "mobile" => "bitwarden://sso-callback".to_string(),
"cli" => {
let port_regex = Regex::new(r"^http://localhost:([0-9]{4})$").unwrap();
match port_regex.captures(raw_redirect_uri).and_then(|captures| captures.get(1).map(|c| c.as_str())) {
Some(port) => format!("http://localhost:{}", port),
None => err!("Failed to extract port number"),
}
}
_ => err!(format!("Unsupported client {client_id}")),
};
let client = CoreClient::cached().await?;
let mut auth_req = client
.authorize_url(
AuthenticationFlow::<CoreResponseType>::AuthorizationCode,
|| CsrfToken::new(state),
Nonce::new_random,
)
.add_scopes(scopes)
.add_extra_params(CONFIG.sso_authorize_extra_params_vec()?);
let verifier = if CONFIG.sso_pkce() {
let (pkce_challenge, pkce_verifier) = PkceCodeChallenge::new_random_sha256();
auth_req = auth_req.set_pkce_challenge(pkce_challenge);
Some(pkce_verifier.secret().to_string())
} else {
None
};
let (auth_url, csrf_state, nonce) = auth_req.url();
let sso_nonce = SsoNonce::new(csrf_state.secret().to_string(), nonce.secret().to_string(), verifier, redirect_uri);
sso_nonce.save(&mut conn).await?;
Ok(auth_url)
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct AuthenticatedUser {
pub refresh_token: Option<String>,
pub access_token: String,
pub expires_in: Option<Duration>,
pub identifier: String,
pub email: String,
pub email_verified: Option<bool>,
pub user_name: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct UserInformation {
pub state: String,
pub identifier: String,
pub email: String,
pub email_verified: Option<bool>,
pub user_name: Option<String>,
}
async fn decode_code_claims(code: &str, conn: &mut DbConn) -> ApiResult<(String, String)> {
match auth::decode_jwt::<OIDCCodeClaims>(code, SSO_JWT_ISSUER.to_string()) {
Ok(code_claims) => match code_claims.code {
OIDCCodeWrapper::Ok {
code,
state,
} => Ok((code, state)),
OIDCCodeWrapper::Error {
state,
error,
error_description,
} => {
if let Err(err) = SsoNonce::delete(&state, conn).await {
error!("Failed to delete database sso_nonce using {state}: {err}")
}
err!(format!(
"SSO authorization failed: {error}, {}",
error_description.as_ref().unwrap_or(&String::new())
))
}
},
Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to decode code wrapper: {err}")),
}
}
// During the 2FA flow we will
// - retrieve the user information and then only discover he needs 2FA.
// - second time we will rely on the `AC_CACHE` since the `code` has already been exchanged.
// The `nonce` will ensure that the user is authorized only once.
// We return only the `UserInformation` to force calling `redeem` to obtain the `refresh_token`.
pub async fn exchange_code(wrapped_code: &str, conn: &mut DbConn) -> ApiResult<UserInformation> {
let (code, state) = decode_code_claims(wrapped_code, conn).await?;
if let Some(authenticated_user) = AC_CACHE.get(&state) {
return Ok(UserInformation {
state,
identifier: authenticated_user.identifier,
email: authenticated_user.email,
email_verified: authenticated_user.email_verified,
user_name: authenticated_user.user_name,
});
}
let oidc_code = AuthorizationCode::new(code.clone());
let client = CoreClient::cached().await?;
let nonce = match SsoNonce::find(&state, conn).await {
None => err!(format!("Invalid state cannot retrieve nonce")),
Some(nonce) => nonce,
};
let mut exchange = client.exchange_code(oidc_code);
if CONFIG.sso_pkce() {
match nonce.verifier {
None => err!(format!("Missing verifier in the DB nonce table")),
Some(secret) => exchange = exchange.set_pkce_verifier(PkceCodeVerifier::new(secret)),
}
}
match exchange.request_async(async_http_client).await {
Ok(token_response) => {
let user_info = client.user_info_async(token_response.access_token().to_owned()).await?;
let oidc_nonce = Nonce::new(nonce.nonce.clone());
let id_token = match token_response.extra_fields().id_token() {
None => err!("Token response did not contain an id_token"),
Some(token) => token,
};
if CONFIG.sso_debug_tokens() {
debug!("Id token: {}", id_token.to_string());
debug!("Access token: {}", token_response.access_token().secret().to_string());
debug!("Refresh token: {:?}", token_response.refresh_token().map(|t| t.secret().to_string()));
debug!("Expiration time: {:?}", token_response.expires_in());
}
let id_claims = match id_token.claims(&client.vw_id_token_verifier(), &oidc_nonce) {
Ok(claims) => claims,
Err(err) => {
if CONFIG.sso_client_cache_expiration() > 0 {
CLIENT_CACHE.invalidate(&*CLIENT_CACHE_KEY);
}
err!(format!("Could not read id_token claims, {err}"));
}
};
let email = match id_claims.email() {
Some(email) => email.to_string(),
None => match user_info.email() {
None => err!("Neither id token nor userinfo contained an email"),
Some(email) => email.to_owned().to_string(),
},
}
.to_lowercase();
let user_name = user_info.preferred_username().map(|un| un.to_string());
let refresh_token = token_response.refresh_token().map(|t| t.secret().to_string());
if refresh_token.is_none() && CONFIG.sso_scopes_vec().contains(&"offline_access".to_string()) {
error!("Scope offline_access is present but response contain no refresh_token");
}
let identifier = format!("{}/{}", **id_claims.issuer(), **id_claims.subject());
let authenticated_user = AuthenticatedUser {
refresh_token,
access_token: token_response.access_token().secret().to_string(),
expires_in: token_response.expires_in(),
identifier: identifier.clone(),
email: email.clone(),
email_verified: id_claims.email_verified(),
user_name: user_name.clone(),
};
AC_CACHE.insert(state.clone(), authenticated_user.clone());
Ok(UserInformation {
state,
identifier,
email,
email_verified: id_claims.email_verified(),
user_name,
})
}
Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to contact token endpoint: {err}")),
}
}
// User has passed 2FA flow we can delete `nonce` and clear the cache.
pub async fn redeem(state: &String, conn: &mut DbConn) -> ApiResult<AuthenticatedUser> {
if let Err(err) = SsoNonce::delete(state, conn).await {
error!("Failed to delete database sso_nonce using {state}: {err}")
}
if let Some(au) = AC_CACHE.get(state) {
AC_CACHE.invalidate(state);
Ok(au)
} else {
err!("Failed to retrieve user info from sso cache")
}
}
// We always return a refresh_token (with no refresh_token some secrets are not displayed in the web front).
// If there is no SSO refresh_token, we keep the access_token to be able to call user_info to check for validity
pub fn create_auth_tokens(
device: &Device,
user: &User,
refresh_token: Option<String>,
access_token: &str,
expires_in: Option<Duration>,
) -> ApiResult<AuthTokens> {
if !CONFIG.sso_auth_only_not_session() {
let now = Utc::now();
let (ap_nbf, ap_exp) = match (decode_token_claims("access_token", access_token), expires_in) {
(Ok(ap), _) => (ap.nbf(), ap.exp),
(Err(_), Some(exp)) => (now.timestamp(), (now + exp).timestamp()),
_ => err!("Non jwt access_token and empty expires_in"),
};
let access_claims = auth::LoginJwtClaims::new(device, user, ap_nbf, ap_exp, AuthMethod::Sso.scope_vec(), now);
_create_auth_tokens(device, refresh_token, access_claims, access_token)
} else {
Ok(AuthTokens::new(device, user, AuthMethod::Sso))
}
}
fn _create_auth_tokens(
device: &Device,
refresh_token: Option<String>,
access_claims: auth::LoginJwtClaims,
access_token: &str,
) -> ApiResult<AuthTokens> {
let (nbf, exp, token) = if let Some(rt) = refresh_token.as_ref() {
match decode_token_claims("refresh_token", rt) {
Err(_) => {
let time_now = Utc::now();
let exp = (time_now + *DEFAULT_REFRESH_VALIDITY).timestamp();
debug!("Non jwt refresh_token (expiration set to {})", exp);
(time_now.timestamp(), exp, TokenWrapper::Refresh(rt.to_string()))
}
Ok(refresh_payload) => {
debug!("Refresh_payload: {:?}", refresh_payload);
(refresh_payload.nbf(), refresh_payload.exp, TokenWrapper::Refresh(rt.to_string()))
}
}
} else {
debug!("No refresh_token present");
(access_claims.nbf, access_claims.exp, TokenWrapper::Access(access_token.to_string()))
};
let refresh_claims = auth::RefreshJwtClaims {
nbf,
exp,
iss: auth::JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub: AuthMethod::Sso,
device_token: device.refresh_token.clone(),
token: Some(token),
};
Ok(AuthTokens {
refresh_claims,
access_claims,
})
}
// This endpoint is called in two case
// - the session is close to expiration we will try to extend it
// - the user is going to make an action and we check that the session is still valid
pub async fn exchange_refresh_token(
device: &Device,
user: &User,
refresh_claims: &auth::RefreshJwtClaims,
) -> ApiResult<AuthTokens> {
match &refresh_claims.token {
Some(TokenWrapper::Refresh(refresh_token)) => {
let rt = RefreshToken::new(refresh_token.to_string());
let client = CoreClient::cached().await?;
let token_response = match client.exchange_refresh_token(&rt).request_async(async_http_client).await {
Err(err) => err!(format!("Request to exchange_refresh_token endpoint failed: {:?}", err)),
Ok(token_response) => token_response,
};
// Use new refresh_token if returned
let rolled_refresh_token = token_response
.refresh_token()
.map(|token| token.secret().to_string())
.unwrap_or(refresh_token.to_string());
create_auth_tokens(
device,
user,
Some(rolled_refresh_token),
token_response.access_token().secret(),
token_response.expires_in(),
)
}
Some(TokenWrapper::Access(access_token)) => {
let now = Utc::now();
let exp_limit = (now + *BW_EXPIRATION).timestamp();
if refresh_claims.exp < exp_limit {
err_silent!("Access token is close to expiration but we have no refresh token")
}
let client = CoreClient::cached().await?;
match client.user_info_async(AccessToken::new(access_token.to_string())).await {
Err(err) => {
err_silent!(format!("Failed to retrieve user info, token has probably been invalidated: {err}"))
}
Ok(_) => {
let access_claims = auth::LoginJwtClaims::new(
device,
user,
now.timestamp(),
refresh_claims.exp,
AuthMethod::Sso.scope_vec(),
now,
);
_create_auth_tokens(device, None, access_claims, access_token)
}
}
}
None => err!("No token present while in SSO"),
}
}

@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Your Email Changed
<!---------------->
Your email was changed in your SSO Provider. Please update your email in Account Settings ({{url}}).
{{> email/email_footer_text }}

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
Your Email Changed
<!---------------->
{{> email/email_header }}
<table width="100%" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="margin: 0; font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none;">
<tr style="margin: 0; font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none;">
<td class="content-block" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; margin: 0; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; padding: 0 0 10px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none; text-align: center;" valign="top" align="center">
Your email was changed in your SSO Provider. Please update your email in <a href="{{url}}/">Account Settings</a>.
</td>
</tr>
</table>
{{> email/email_footer }}

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use std::{collections::HashMap, io::Cursor, ops::Deref, path::Path};
use num_traits::ToPrimitive;
use rocket::{
fairing::{Fairing, Info, Kind},
http::{ContentType, Cookie, CookieJar, Header, HeaderMap, Method, SameSite, Status},
http::{ContentType, Header, HeaderMap, Method, Status},
request::FromParam,
response::{self, Responder},
Data, Orbit, Request, Response, Rocket,
@ -129,10 +129,12 @@ impl Cors {
// If a match exists, return it. Otherwise, return None.
fn get_allowed_origin(headers: &HeaderMap<'_>) -> Option<String> {
let origin = Cors::get_header(headers, "Origin");
let domain_origin = CONFIG.domain_origin();
let sso_origin = CONFIG.sso_authority();
let safari_extension_origin = "file://";
if origin == domain_origin || origin == safari_extension_origin || origin == sso_origin {
if origin == CONFIG.domain_origin()
|| origin == safari_extension_origin
|| (CONFIG.sso_enabled() && origin == CONFIG.sso_authority())
{
Some(origin)
} else {
None
@ -257,33 +259,6 @@ impl<'r> FromParam<'r> for SafeString {
}
}
pub struct CustomRedirect {
pub url: String,
pub headers: Vec<(String, String)>,
}
impl<'r> rocket::response::Responder<'r, 'static> for CustomRedirect {
fn respond_to(self, _: &rocket::request::Request<'_>) -> rocket::response::Result<'static> {
let mut response = Response::build()
.status(rocket::http::Status {
code: 307,
})
.raw_header("Location", self.url)
.header(ContentType::HTML)
.finalize();
// Normal headers
response.set_raw_header("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin");
response.set_raw_header("X-XSS-Protection", "0");
for header in &self.headers {
response.set_raw_header(header.0.clone(), header.1.clone());
}
Ok(response)
}
}
// Log all the routes from the main paths list, and the attachments endpoint
// Effectively ignores, any static file route, and the alive endpoint
const LOGGED_ROUTES: [&str; 7] = ["/api", "/admin", "/identity", "/icons", "/attachments", "/events", "/notifications"];
@ -903,29 +878,3 @@ mod tests {
});
}
}
pub struct CookieManager<'a> {
jar: &'a CookieJar<'a>,
}
impl<'a> CookieManager<'a> {
pub fn new(jar: &'a CookieJar<'a>) -> Self {
Self {
jar,
}
}
pub fn set_cookie(&self, name: String, value: String) {
let cookie = Cookie::build((name, value)).same_site(SameSite::Lax);
self.jar.add(cookie)
}
pub fn get_cookie(&self, name: String) -> Option<String> {
self.jar.get(&name).map(|c| c.value().to_string())
}
pub fn delete_cookie(&self, name: String) {
self.jar.remove(Cookie::from(name));
}
}

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